Conceptualizing IO Emergency Powers

Abstract

This chapter introduces a constitutional perspective on international organizations (IOs) that foregrounds the legally constituted relationship between authority-holders and authority-addressees. Distinct from the common principal–agent perspective, it paves the way for understanding IOs’ crisis-induced authority-leaps as an assumption of emergency powers—an act defined as the constitutionally deviant widening of executive discretion at the expense of the political autonomy of the rule-addressees that is justified by exceptional necessity. The chapter taxonomizes the possible institutional embodiments of IO exceptionalism according to its constitution, reach, and intrusiveness and highlights its phenomenological differences with respect to domestic exceptionalism. Given the structural conditions of the international spheres of authority in which IO exceptionalism operates, it is expected to rely on the acquiescence of the most powerful member states, to be stratified in scope and application according to states’ power differentials, and to instrumentalize rather than openly suspend norms of international law.