UNTANGLE: Unlocking Routing and Logic Obfuscation Using Graph Neural Networks-based Link Prediction

Lilas Alrahis, Satwik Patnaik, Muhammad Abdullah Hanif, M. Shafique, O. Sinanoglu
{"title":"UNTANGLE: Unlocking Routing and Logic Obfuscation Using Graph Neural Networks-based Link Prediction","authors":"Lilas Alrahis, Satwik Patnaik, Muhammad Abdullah Hanif, M. Shafique, O. Sinanoglu","doi":"10.1109/ICCAD51958.2021.9643476","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Logic locking aims to prevent intellectual property (IP) piracy and unauthorized overproduction of integrated circuits (ICs). However, initial logic locking techniques were vulnerable to the Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attacks. In response, researchers proposed various SAT-resistant locking techniques such as point function-based locking and symmetric interconnection (SAT-hard) obfuscation. We focus on the latter since point function-based locking suffers from various structural vulnerabilities. The SAT-hard logic locking technique, InterLock [1], achieves a unified logic and routing obfuscation that thwarts state-of-the-art attacks on logic locking. In this work, we propose a novel link prediction-based attack, UNTANGLE, that successfully breaks InterLock in an oracle-less setting without having access to an activated IC (oracle). Since InterLock hides selected timing paths in key-controlled routing blocks, UNTANGLE reveals the gates and interconnections hidden in the routing blocks upon formulating this task as a link prediction problem. The intuition behind our approach is that ICs contain a large amount of repetition and reuse cores. Hence, UNTANGLE can infer the hidden timing paths by learning the composition of gates in the observed locked netlist or a circuit library leveraging graph neural networks. We show that circuits withstanding SAT-based and other attacks can be unlocked in seconds with 100% precision using UNTANGLE in an oracle-less setting. UNTANGLE is a generic attack platform (which we also open source [2]) that applies to multiplexer (MUX)-based obfuscation, as demonstrated through our experiments on ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 benchmarks locked using InterLock and random MUX-based locking.","PeriodicalId":370791,"journal":{"name":"2021 IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"16","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 IEEE/ACM International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCAD51958.2021.9643476","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 16

Abstract

Logic locking aims to prevent intellectual property (IP) piracy and unauthorized overproduction of integrated circuits (ICs). However, initial logic locking techniques were vulnerable to the Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based attacks. In response, researchers proposed various SAT-resistant locking techniques such as point function-based locking and symmetric interconnection (SAT-hard) obfuscation. We focus on the latter since point function-based locking suffers from various structural vulnerabilities. The SAT-hard logic locking technique, InterLock [1], achieves a unified logic and routing obfuscation that thwarts state-of-the-art attacks on logic locking. In this work, we propose a novel link prediction-based attack, UNTANGLE, that successfully breaks InterLock in an oracle-less setting without having access to an activated IC (oracle). Since InterLock hides selected timing paths in key-controlled routing blocks, UNTANGLE reveals the gates and interconnections hidden in the routing blocks upon formulating this task as a link prediction problem. The intuition behind our approach is that ICs contain a large amount of repetition and reuse cores. Hence, UNTANGLE can infer the hidden timing paths by learning the composition of gates in the observed locked netlist or a circuit library leveraging graph neural networks. We show that circuits withstanding SAT-based and other attacks can be unlocked in seconds with 100% precision using UNTANGLE in an oracle-less setting. UNTANGLE is a generic attack platform (which we also open source [2]) that applies to multiplexer (MUX)-based obfuscation, as demonstrated through our experiments on ISCAS-85 and ITC-99 benchmarks locked using InterLock and random MUX-based locking.
UNTANGLE:使用基于图神经网络的链路预测解锁路由和逻辑混淆
逻辑锁定旨在防止知识产权(IP)盗版和未经授权的集成电路(ic)的过度生产。然而,初始逻辑锁定技术容易受到基于布尔可满足性(SAT)的攻击。为此,研究人员提出了各种抗sat锁定技术,如基于点函数的锁定和对称互连(SAT-hard)混淆。我们关注后者,因为基于点函数的锁定存在各种结构漏洞。sat硬逻辑锁定技术InterLock[1]实现了统一的逻辑和路由混淆,从而挫败了对逻辑锁定的最先进攻击。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种新颖的基于链路预测的攻击,UNTANGLE,它成功地在无oracle设置中破坏InterLock,而无需访问激活的IC (oracle)。由于InterLock在键控路由块中隐藏了选定的定时路径,UNTANGLE在将此任务制定为链路预测问题时揭示了隐藏在路由块中的门和互连。我们的方法背后的直觉是,ic包含大量的重复和重用核心。因此,UNTANGLE可以通过学习观察到的锁定网表或利用图神经网络的电路库中的门的组成来推断隐藏的时序路径。我们表明,在无oracle设置中使用UNTANGLE可以在几秒钟内以100%的精度解锁承受基于sat和其他攻击的电路。UNTANGLE是一个通用的攻击平台(我们也开源[2]),适用于基于多路复用器(MUX)的混淆,正如我们在ISCAS-85和ITC-99基准上的实验所证明的那样,使用InterLock和随机MUX锁定锁定。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信