Technological Neutrality Explained & Applied to CBC v. SODRAC

Cameron J. Hutchison
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

The term “technological neutrality” surfaced in the Supreme Court’s 2012 copyright jurisprudence though no one, including the Federal Court of Appeal in CBC v. SODRAC , quite knows exactly what it means. This paper analyzes the principle of technological neutrality as comprising two dimensions: as non-discrimination in that new technologies are to be embraced under the Copyright Act for both copyright holders and users; and as non-interference insofar as sufficiently high thresholds of conduct or activity are required before copyright liability will attach to emerging technologies. It may surprise some that both iterations of this principle (though not so named) are well established in Supreme Court copyright jurisprudence. Once these dimensions are understood, we must then struggle with the issue of its application as a “principle” of copyright law. I argue that principles of law assist interpretation by providing direction in the face of ambiguous or absurd statutory meaning in unusual cases. In other words, principles rationalize the law in a way that strict construction of statutory meaning cannot always accomplish. Principles do not compel specific results but rather are a tool that might augur for a particular interpretation of statutory meaning in a given factual context in order to make the law coherent.The paper explores technological neutrality in the factual context of CBC v. SODRAC, tentatively scheduled for argument before the Supreme Court of Canada in March of 2015. After outlining the history of the case in the first part, the paper concludes with an application of the principle of technological neutrality, as non-interference, to the case. The only result coherent with the Supreme Court’s prior case law is to not treat non-usable or dormant incidental copies as reproductions under the Act. The status of permanent copies that serve a useful and identifiable purpose, e.g. archived copies, is less clear though it would not necessarily create incoherence in the law to recognize them as reproductions.
技术中立性在CBC诉SODRAC案中的解释与应用
“技术中立”一词出现在最高法院2012年的版权判例中,尽管没有人知道它的确切含义,包括联邦上诉法院在CBC诉SODRAC案中。本文分析了技术中立性原则,认为它包括两个方面:一是不歧视,即版权所有者和用户都应接受《版权法》规定的新技术;在新兴技术承担版权责任之前,只要要求足够高的行为或活动门槛,就不受干涉。可能会让一些人感到惊讶的是,这一原则的两种重复(尽管没有这样命名)都在最高法院的版权判例中得到了很好的确立。一旦理解了这些维度,我们就必须努力解决其作为版权法“原则”的应用问题。我认为,在不寻常的情况下,面对模棱两可或荒谬的法定含义,法律原则通过提供指导来协助解释。换句话说,原则使法律合理化,这是严格构建成文法意义所不能达到的。原则并不强制规定具体的结果,而是一种工具,它可能预示着在特定的事实背景下对法定意义作出特定的解释,以便使法律连贯一致。本文在CBC诉SODRAC案的事实背景下探讨了技术中立性,该案件暂定于2015年3月在加拿大最高法院进行辩论。在第一部分概述了案件的历史之后,本文最后提出了技术中立原则,即不干涉原则在案件中的应用。与最高法院先前判例法一致的唯一结果是不将不可使用的或休眠的附带副本视为该法案下的复制品。具有有用和可识别目的的永久副本,例如存档副本,其地位不太明确,尽管承认它们为复制品不一定会在法律上造成不一致。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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