{"title":"Populism, Political Regimes, and COVID-19 Deaths","authors":"Gabriel Cepaluni, M. Dorsch, Semir Dzebo","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3816398","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Previous research has shown that more democratic countries suffered greater COVID-19 deaths per capita and implemented policy measures that were less effective at reducing deaths than less democratic countries in the early stages of the pandemic (Cepaluni et al. 2020, Cheibub et al. 2020). But to what extent is this \"autocratic advantage\" driven by populist governments in democracies? This chapter presents new evidence that the documented effect is not driven by the subset of democracies that have populist governments. While across the entire sample, populism is associated with a greater COVID-19 death toll per capita, the deleterious effect of populism is weaker in relatively more democratic states. We argue that weaker checks and balances in more authoritarian political institutions explain the differential effect. Moreover, when examining characteristics of populism, we document that left-wing populism and anti-elite populism has been more damaging in less democratic states. Our study pursues a series of statistical analyses, employing a battery of controls that is common in this literature and a sensitivity analysis showing that our findings are robust and most likely causal.","PeriodicalId":443031,"journal":{"name":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-03-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"8","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Political Economy - Development: Political Institutions eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3816398","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 8
Abstract
Previous research has shown that more democratic countries suffered greater COVID-19 deaths per capita and implemented policy measures that were less effective at reducing deaths than less democratic countries in the early stages of the pandemic (Cepaluni et al. 2020, Cheibub et al. 2020). But to what extent is this "autocratic advantage" driven by populist governments in democracies? This chapter presents new evidence that the documented effect is not driven by the subset of democracies that have populist governments. While across the entire sample, populism is associated with a greater COVID-19 death toll per capita, the deleterious effect of populism is weaker in relatively more democratic states. We argue that weaker checks and balances in more authoritarian political institutions explain the differential effect. Moreover, when examining characteristics of populism, we document that left-wing populism and anti-elite populism has been more damaging in less democratic states. Our study pursues a series of statistical analyses, employing a battery of controls that is common in this literature and a sensitivity analysis showing that our findings are robust and most likely causal.
先前的研究表明,在大流行的早期阶段,与民主程度较低的国家相比,民主程度较高的国家的人均COVID-19死亡人数更高,并且实施的政策措施在减少死亡人数方面效果较差(Cepaluni et al. 2020, Cheibub et al. 2020)。但民主国家民粹主义政府在多大程度上推动了这种“专制优势”?本章提出了新的证据,证明记录在案的影响并非由拥有民粹主义政府的民主国家子集驱动。虽然在整个样本中,民粹主义与更高的人均COVID-19死亡人数有关,但在相对更民主的国家,民粹主义的有害影响较弱。我们认为,更专制的政治制度中较弱的制衡可以解释这种差异效应。此外,在考察民粹主义的特征时,我们发现左翼民粹主义和反精英民粹主义在民主程度较低的国家更具破坏性。我们的研究进行了一系列统计分析,采用了本文献中常见的一系列控制方法,并进行了敏感性分析,表明我们的发现是稳健的,最有可能是因果关系。