Private Insurers to Cushion Federal Deposit Insurance

Thang Dang
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Abstract

This research describes the views on the existed mechanism of the federal deposit insurance in the United States. It criticizes this deposit insurance system is so much involved with the circumvention from the government, exploiting deeply the government’s reserves that contributed by the U.S. taxpayers, possibly causing the conflicts of interests in the bank’s corporate governance, hardly ending the government’s bailouts in future’s crisis, and incidentally nationalizing of private banks. The herein analysis explains how the lack of a risk-reducing mechanism in the existed federal deposit insurance system nurtures the moral hazard in banking industry, critically contributes to the addressed problems. It further discusses on the government’s circumvention to the banking system through the federal deposit insurance likely illustrates a step the government made into the alliance of itself and the businesses. On the other hand, such circumvention also makes the banks extremely distinctive with extraordinary privileges despite fact the banks are generally the business entity like any and all other private entrepreneurs in the U.S. As a result, this research is aim at introducing a solution to not only protect the legitimate rights of depositors, but also to push the banks back to their private business environment, in equal to other business sectors. The solution further aims to prevent the depletion of American taxpayers’ money used by the government in rescuing banks. So this research’s first part briefly describes typical characters of the existed mechanism of the federal deposit insurance. The second part subjectively addresses the remained problems in the existed system deposit insurance. This research introduces in its third part a solution of having private insurers to cushion in federal deposit insurance, before allowing the insured depositors reach up the federal insurance funds, and making a buffer to the alliance of the government and the businesses.
私营保险公司为联邦存款保险提供缓冲
本研究阐述了对美国联邦存款保险现有机制的看法。它批评这种存款保险制度与政府的规避密切相关,深深利用了美国纳税人贡献的政府储备,可能导致银行公司治理中的利益冲突,难以结束政府在未来危机中的救助,并偶然将私人银行国有化。本文的分析解释了现有联邦存款保险制度中缺乏降低风险的机制如何培育银行业的道德风险,这对解决问题至关重要。它进一步讨论了政府通过联邦存款保险规避银行体系的问题,这可能说明了政府向自己和企业的联盟迈出了一步。另一方面,这种规避也使银行具有极大的特殊性和特权,尽管事实上银行与美国的任何其他私营企业家一样,通常都是商业实体。因此,本研究旨在引入一种解决方案,既保护存款人的合法权利,又将银行推回到私营商业环境中,与其他商业部门平等。该解决方案进一步旨在防止美国纳税人用于救助银行的资金枯竭。因此,本研究的第一部分简要描述了联邦存款保险现有机制的典型特征。第二部分主观上论述了现行存款保险制度存在的问题。本研究的第三部分提出了一种解决方案,即在允许被保险的存款人获得联邦保险基金之前,由私营保险公司在联邦存款保险中提供缓冲,并为政府和企业的联盟提供缓冲。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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