Antitrust for Institutional Investors

Edward B. Rock, D. Rubinfeld
{"title":"Antitrust for Institutional Investors","authors":"Edward B. Rock, D. Rubinfeld","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.2998296","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"With the increasing concentration of shares in the hands of large institutional investors, combined with greater involvement in corporate governance, the antitrust risk of common ownership has moved to center stage. Through an excess of enthusiasm, portfolio managers could end up exposing their firms and the portfolio companies to huge antitrust liability. In this Article, we start from basic antitrust principles to sketch out an antitrust compliance program for institutional investors and for the investor relations groups in portfolio companies. In doing so, we address the fundamental antitrust issues (explicit and tacit coordination) raised by the presence of common ownership by large, diversified investors. \nWe then turn to more speculative concerns that have garnered a great deal of attention and that, to our eyes, threaten to divert attention from the core antitrust issues. We critically examine the claims of this newer literature, as illustrated by Azar, Schmaltz and Tecu (2017), that existing ownership patterns in the airline industry results in substantially higher prices. We then turn to the argument in Elhauge (2016) that existing ownership patterns violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Finally, we find the policy recommendations of Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017) to limit the ownership shares of multiple firms in oligopolistic industries to be overly stringent. To limit the chilling effect of antitrust on the valuable role of institutional investors in corporate governance, we propose a quasi “safe harbor” that protects investors from antitrust liability when their ownership share is less than 15 percent, the investors have no board representation, and they only engage in “normal” corporate governance activities.","PeriodicalId":440695,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","volume":"29 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"27","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Governance: Actors & Players eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2998296","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 27

Abstract

With the increasing concentration of shares in the hands of large institutional investors, combined with greater involvement in corporate governance, the antitrust risk of common ownership has moved to center stage. Through an excess of enthusiasm, portfolio managers could end up exposing their firms and the portfolio companies to huge antitrust liability. In this Article, we start from basic antitrust principles to sketch out an antitrust compliance program for institutional investors and for the investor relations groups in portfolio companies. In doing so, we address the fundamental antitrust issues (explicit and tacit coordination) raised by the presence of common ownership by large, diversified investors. We then turn to more speculative concerns that have garnered a great deal of attention and that, to our eyes, threaten to divert attention from the core antitrust issues. We critically examine the claims of this newer literature, as illustrated by Azar, Schmaltz and Tecu (2017), that existing ownership patterns in the airline industry results in substantially higher prices. We then turn to the argument in Elhauge (2016) that existing ownership patterns violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Finally, we find the policy recommendations of Posner, Scott Morton, and Weyl (2017) to limit the ownership shares of multiple firms in oligopolistic industries to be overly stringent. To limit the chilling effect of antitrust on the valuable role of institutional investors in corporate governance, we propose a quasi “safe harbor” that protects investors from antitrust liability when their ownership share is less than 15 percent, the investors have no board representation, and they only engage in “normal” corporate governance activities.
机构投资者反垄断
随着大型机构投资者手中的股份越来越集中,再加上更多地参与公司治理,共同所有权的反垄断风险已经成为人们关注的焦点。由于过度的热情,投资组合经理可能最终使他们的公司和投资组合公司面临巨大的反垄断责任。在本文中,我们从反垄断的基本原则出发,为机构投资者和投资组合公司的投资者关系团队制定了反垄断合规计划。在此过程中,我们解决了大型多元化投资者共同所有权所带来的基本反垄断问题(明确和隐性协调)。然后,我们转向更多的投机性问题,这些问题已经引起了大量关注,在我们看来,它们可能会转移人们对核心反垄断问题的关注。正如Azar、Schmaltz和Tecu(2017)所阐述的那样,我们批判性地审视了这些新文献的观点,即航空业现有的所有权模式导致价格大幅上涨。然后,我们转向Elhauge(2016)的论点,即现有的所有权模式违反了《克莱顿法》第7条。最后,我们发现Posner、Scott Morton和Weyl(2017)限制寡头垄断行业中多家公司的所有权份额的政策建议过于严格。为了限制反垄断对机构投资者在公司治理中的重要作用的寒蝉效应,我们提出了一个准“安全港”,当投资者的所有权份额低于15%,投资者没有董事会代表,并且他们只参与“正常”的公司治理活动时,保护投资者免受反垄断责任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信