Is Empathy Necessary for the Practice of "Good" Medicine

Abstract

Medicine is explicitly committed to the traditional values of empathy, compassion, and altruism. Along with the "middle" principles of beneficence, non-maleficence, justice and respect for autonomy, these are among the values which form the ethical framework by which physician conduct is evaluated. But how is empathy to be understood as fun- damental to the practice of ethical medicine? Should it be construed as a moral obligation? In this paper, I argue that em- pathy in the treatment of patients should not be upheld as a moral requirement for the practice of "good" medicine: such a construal of the role of empathy in professionalism cannot be supported by the substantive theories of utilitarianism, deon- tology, feminist ethics, or virtue ethics. Moreover, empirical research into the nature of empathy shows it to be a trait that varies substantially between individuals and that variation is governed to a notable degree by factors beyond the individ- ual's control.