Nietzsche

T. Irwin
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Abstract

Nietzsche questions the claim—accepted by sentimentalists, rationalists, and Kant—that we have good reasons for accepting moral principles and acting on them. We can see why this claim is open to question if we consider the origins of our moral beliefs and attitudes. They arise from the resentment of inferior people who feel humiliated by the achievements of others. The effect of general observance of moral principles can be seen in the modern democratic spirit, which restrains and penalizes the development of any capacities and talents that tend to make some people superior to others. Belief in the equal moral value of everyone is a consolation for inferior people. When we recognize this psychological basis for our moral outlook, we will be less inclined to suppose that it has any special authority.
尼采
尼采质疑感伤主义者、理性主义者和康德所接受的主张,即我们有充分的理由接受道德原则并据此行事。如果我们考虑一下我们的道德信仰和态度的起源,我们就会明白为什么这种说法是值得质疑的。它们源于自卑的人对别人的成就感到羞辱的怨恨。普遍遵守道德原则的效果可以在现代民主精神中看到,它限制和惩罚任何能力和才能的发展,这些能力和才能往往使一些人优于其他人。相信每个人的道德价值都是平等的,这是对劣等人的一种安慰。当我们认识到我们的道德观的这种心理基础时,我们就不会那么倾向于认为它有什么特殊的权威。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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