Proposal and Evaluation of a Gesture Authentication Method with Peep Resistance for Smartwatches

Abstract

The use of mobile terminals with small touchscreens such as smartwatches has increased dramatically in recent years. A PIN or pattern lock is commonly used for personal authentication on such devices, but because the information is displayed directly, authentication information can be leaked to someone peeking at the screen. In this paper, we propose a gesture-based smartwatch authentication method that reduces the likelihood of leaks by allowing the owner to include a dummy (or "fake") number at the time of authentication registration. The dummy number enables the user to perform an authenticating gesture different from that indicated by the icon displayed on the screen. In a series of experiments, we confirmed the usability of the proposed method, evaluated the effect of long-term familiarity and assessed the method’s resistance to shoulder-surfing. In the usability experiment, the authentication time and success rate were 10.9 seconds and 73.3%, respectively. The authentication time and success rate in the long-term familiarity experiment improved to 8.8 seconds and 93%, and the leakage rate in the peep experiments was 0%.