{"title":"MÉGADONNÉES ET EXTERNALITÉS INFORMATIONNELLES","authors":"Claude-Denys Fluet","doi":"10.7202/1076264ar","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"A recent literature raises the question of the desirable degree of visibility or publicity of individual behaviors. In these analyzes, greater visibility strengthens reputation incentives, which can be socially useful. In return, the resulting behaviors are less informative about the characteristics of individuals, which can be undesirable. I re-examine this question in a context where more visibility stems from a greater number of sources of information on the actions of individuals, in multiple contractual interactions. Contrary to recent literature, more visibility then has the effect of diluting or even completely eliminatiing reputational incentives. In return, this improves information on the characteristics of individuals, with the ultimate disappearance of information asymmetries.","PeriodicalId":405226,"journal":{"name":"L'Actualité économique","volume":"92 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"L'Actualité économique","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.7202/1076264ar","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
A recent literature raises the question of the desirable degree of visibility or publicity of individual behaviors. In these analyzes, greater visibility strengthens reputation incentives, which can be socially useful. In return, the resulting behaviors are less informative about the characteristics of individuals, which can be undesirable. I re-examine this question in a context where more visibility stems from a greater number of sources of information on the actions of individuals, in multiple contractual interactions. Contrary to recent literature, more visibility then has the effect of diluting or even completely eliminatiing reputational incentives. In return, this improves information on the characteristics of individuals, with the ultimate disappearance of information asymmetries.