Which, if Either, Are We to Assess Directly in Terms of What Ultimately Matters

Abstract

This chapter argues that our uncertainty with respect to whether a subject has violated a constraint in ϕ‎-ing can stem not only from our limited knowledge of the actual world but also from the indeterminacy that’s inherent in certain possible worlds. And this means that constraint-accepting theorists will need to find a way to deal with such uncertainty even when it comes to giving an account of objective rightness. And it’s argued that the best way for constraint-accepting theorists to deal with this issue is to adopt a teleological theory. In doing so, she needn’t give up on any of our common-sense moral intuitions. Nor would she need to give up the deontological idea that constraints are ultimately grounded in our duty to respect people and their capacity for rational, autonomous decision making. Thus, it’s argued that we should accept a teleological version of rationalist maximalism.