Is Cartesian Skepticism Too Cartesian?

Abstract

I understand Cartesian skepticism to be the doctrine that we lack all or nearly all knowledge of the external world. A prominent response is that Cartesian skepticism is too Cartesian. It arises from outmoded views in epistemology and the philosophy of mind that we now properly reject. We can and should move on to other things.1 §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, underdetermination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism.2 §3 shows how skeptical arguments that emphasize causal considerations can avoid some suspect Cartesian commitments. §4 explores the related idea that perceptual knowledge is what I call instrumental knowledge. Drawing on that connection, §5 examines a skeptical argument based on minimal assumptions, and explains why a Moorean response to it is unsatisfactory. The problem of skepticism is still with us, and it requires a substantive solution.