Thailand’s Flawed 2019 Election Confirms the Country’s Deep Political Divide

Michael H. Nelson
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Abstract

After having been postponed a number of times and over a number of years, the Thai military dictators (the National Council for Peace and Order, or NCPO, in office after their coup of 22 May 2015) finally allowed elections to be held on 24 March 2019. These numerous delays occurred despite the cost of aborting a newly drafted constitution in September 2015. Clearly, the military dictators wanted to spend more time in power. However, it would be a fundamental misperception to consider this election a return to democracy, or the coup as the beginning and the election as the end of a clearly demarcated period ofThai politics. Rather, both events represent elements of an era that began in earnest with the election of telecom-tycoon Thaksin Shinawatra, chairperson (in fact, owner would be a better description) of the Thai Rak Thai (Thais Love Thai) party on 6 January 2001. At that time, Thaksin was threatened with disqualification from politics altogether having submitted wrong asset declarations when serving as a minister in a previous government. While all other similar cases did indeed see the disqualification of the accused by the Constitutional Court, in Thaksin’s case, the court voted 8:7 in his favour in, what one newspaper called, a ‘murky verdict’ (The Nation, 4 August 2001). Obviously, a very high-ranking member of the Thai traditional elite had intervened with the judges as the upper echelons of Thai society still hoped Thaksin would bring a better political-economic future. Moreover, he had out-classed all his competitors in the elections, and was generally seen as a new-generation, visionary political leader. However, these hopes were rapidly overtaken by a very different perspective. As early as October 2001, another high-ranking member of that elite, former two-times prime minister Anand Panyarachun, ominously warned, “Danger caused by people with dictatorial inclinations has not disappeared from Thailand” (Matichon, 8 October 2001). This
泰国2019年有缺陷的选举证实了该国深刻的政治分歧
经过多年的多次推迟,泰国军事独裁者(2015年5月22日政变后执政的全国和平与秩序委员会(National Council for Peace and Order,简称NCPO)最终允许在2019年3月24日举行选举。尽管2015年9月新起草的宪法因流产而付出了代价,但仍出现了如此多的延误。显然,军事独裁者想要在权力上花更多的时间。然而,认为这次选举是民主的回归,或者认为政变是泰国政治的开始,选举是一个明确划分的时期的结束,这将是一个根本性的误解。更确切地说,这两件事代表了一个时代的元素,这个时代始于电信大亨他信•西那瓦于2001年1月6日当选为泰爱泰党(Thai Rak Thai)主席(实际上,更恰当的说法是他信的所有者)。当时,他信在前任政府担任部长期间提交了错误的资产申报,因此受到了完全丧失政治资格的威胁。虽然所有其他类似的案件确实都被宪法法院取消了被告的资格,但在他信一案中,法院以8:7的投票结果支持他信,一家报纸称之为“模糊的判决”(the Nation, 2001年8月4日)。显然,泰国传统精英中的一位非常高级的成员干预了法官,因为泰国社会的上层仍然希望他信能带来更好的政治经济未来。此外,他在选举中超越了所有竞争对手,被普遍视为新一代、有远见的政治领袖。然而,这些希望很快被一种截然不同的观点所取代。早在2001年10月,该精英阶层的另一位高级成员,前两任总理阿南·班雅拉春就不祥地警告说,“具有独裁倾向的人造成的危险并没有从泰国消失”(Matichon, 2001年10月8日)。这
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