{"title":"Do Insiders Comply with Disclosure Rules? Evidence from Canada, 1996-2011","authors":"Lindsay M. Tedds","doi":"10.11575/SPPP.V9I0.42603","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The disclosure of information on the granting of stock options as part of senior managers’ compensation packages can be a cumbersome and patchy process in terms of both regulatory compliance and public accessibility. Closing the gaps to make the reporting and accessing of data less unwieldy and more timely, efficient and accurate, should be a priority for securities regulators Firms are required to disclose the issuing of stock options to their highestlevel executives in their annual information circulars. Slight additions made to the information provided in the circulars, such as stock option grant dates, would greatly improve corporate transparency. Insiders also need to be educated on their duty to file, as they bear a fair amount of the responsibility for the problems in the system. Insiders’ lack of awareness about compliance contributes to discrepancies between insider disclosure and company disclosure, and creates information gaps. Misfiling, failure to file, and late filing of data — which can be a chronic problem — further hamper the disclosure process. Add to this the issue of limited accessibility created by a frustrating lack of linkage between databases and a paucity of online searchability capacity. This paper’s research shows that compliance levels are quite high in regards to reporting of information in proxy circulars. However, 12 per cent of stock option awards are not made public outside of the circulars, with 10 per cent of awards to CEOs, nine per cent to CFOs and 15 per cent to VPs going unfiled. The incidence of unfiled reports also includes 22 per cent of insiders for whom stock options are the only award. Equally worrisome is the fact that 26 per cent of insiders have at least one option award that goes unreported and nearly eight per cent of insiders never file. Some 34 per cent of insider awards are filed with information that differs from the data reported in the firm’s information circular. Confusion and procedural ignorance about compliance on the part of insiders contribute to such discrepancies. The System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR), the continuous disclosure database that firms use, cries out for modernization. Not only does its archaic reporting system limit its accessibility, but it functions separately from the database insiders use, the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI). Linking the two databases would streamline insider filing requirements, increase compliance with insider disclosure, and improve the audit and compliance function of the securities regulators. The financial penalties for non-compliance or irregularities should be an incentive for both insiders and issuers to educate themselves and ensure they are meticulous in producing error-free, timely data and in making those data public. Unfortunately, enforcement is inconsistent. Currently, penalties tend to be applied only if another serious regulatory breach accompanies the misfilings, late filings or chronic nonfilings. Canada’s disclosure system needs fixing and streamlining in order to achieve the highest level of transparency on executive compensation. Some of these fixes are simple, others may be costly, but if improvements are not made, the system’s integrity, along with shareholder and public confidence, risk being seriously compromised.","PeriodicalId":243835,"journal":{"name":"Canadian Law eJournal","volume":"29 16 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2016-10-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Canadian Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.11575/SPPP.V9I0.42603","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
The disclosure of information on the granting of stock options as part of senior managers’ compensation packages can be a cumbersome and patchy process in terms of both regulatory compliance and public accessibility. Closing the gaps to make the reporting and accessing of data less unwieldy and more timely, efficient and accurate, should be a priority for securities regulators Firms are required to disclose the issuing of stock options to their highestlevel executives in their annual information circulars. Slight additions made to the information provided in the circulars, such as stock option grant dates, would greatly improve corporate transparency. Insiders also need to be educated on their duty to file, as they bear a fair amount of the responsibility for the problems in the system. Insiders’ lack of awareness about compliance contributes to discrepancies between insider disclosure and company disclosure, and creates information gaps. Misfiling, failure to file, and late filing of data — which can be a chronic problem — further hamper the disclosure process. Add to this the issue of limited accessibility created by a frustrating lack of linkage between databases and a paucity of online searchability capacity. This paper’s research shows that compliance levels are quite high in regards to reporting of information in proxy circulars. However, 12 per cent of stock option awards are not made public outside of the circulars, with 10 per cent of awards to CEOs, nine per cent to CFOs and 15 per cent to VPs going unfiled. The incidence of unfiled reports also includes 22 per cent of insiders for whom stock options are the only award. Equally worrisome is the fact that 26 per cent of insiders have at least one option award that goes unreported and nearly eight per cent of insiders never file. Some 34 per cent of insider awards are filed with information that differs from the data reported in the firm’s information circular. Confusion and procedural ignorance about compliance on the part of insiders contribute to such discrepancies. The System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR), the continuous disclosure database that firms use, cries out for modernization. Not only does its archaic reporting system limit its accessibility, but it functions separately from the database insiders use, the System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI). Linking the two databases would streamline insider filing requirements, increase compliance with insider disclosure, and improve the audit and compliance function of the securities regulators. The financial penalties for non-compliance or irregularities should be an incentive for both insiders and issuers to educate themselves and ensure they are meticulous in producing error-free, timely data and in making those data public. Unfortunately, enforcement is inconsistent. Currently, penalties tend to be applied only if another serious regulatory breach accompanies the misfilings, late filings or chronic nonfilings. Canada’s disclosure system needs fixing and streamlining in order to achieve the highest level of transparency on executive compensation. Some of these fixes are simple, others may be costly, but if improvements are not made, the system’s integrity, along with shareholder and public confidence, risk being seriously compromised.
就监管合规和公众可及性而言,作为高管薪酬方案一部分的股票期权授予信息的披露可能是一个繁琐且不完整的过程。缩小差距,使数据的报告和访问不那么麻烦,更及时、更高效、更准确,应该是证券监管机构的首要任务。按照要求,公司必须在年度信息通函中向最高管理层披露股票期权的发行情况。对通函中提供的信息稍加补充,如股票期权授予日期,将大大提高公司的透明度。内部人员也需要了解他们的举报义务,因为他们对系统中的问题负有相当大的责任。内部人缺乏合规意识,导致内幕披露与公司披露存在差异,形成信息缺口。错误归档、未归档和延迟归档数据——这可能是一个长期问题——进一步阻碍了披露过程。此外,令人沮丧的是,数据库之间缺乏联系,在线搜索能力不足,这造成了可访问性有限的问题。本文的研究表明,在代理通知中报告信息方面,合规水平相当高。然而,12%的股票期权奖励并未在通知之外公开,其中10%的奖励给了首席执行官,9%给了首席财务官,15%给了副总裁。未提交报告的发生率还包括22%的内部人士,他们的股票期权是唯一的奖励。同样令人担忧的事实是,26%的内部人士至少有一项期权奖励没有申报,近8%的内部人士从未申报。约34%的内部人奖励所提交的信息与公司信息通报中报告的数据不同。内部人士对合规的困惑和程序上的无知导致了这种差异。电子文件分析和检索系统(SEDAR),公司使用的连续披露数据库,迫切需要现代化。它陈旧的报告系统不仅限制了它的可访问性,而且它的功能与内部人员使用的数据库SEDI (system for Electronic Disclosure by insiders)是分开的。将这两个数据库连接起来,将简化内幕申报要求,提高内幕披露的合规性,并改善证券监管机构的审计和合规功能。对违规或违规行为的经济处罚,应该激励内部人士和发行人自我教育,并确保他们一丝不苟地提供无差错、及时的数据,并将这些数据公之于众。不幸的是,执行是不一致的。目前,处罚往往只适用于另一个严重的监管违规伴随着错误申报,延迟申报或长期不申报。加拿大的披露制度需要修正和精简,以便在高管薪酬方面达到最高水平的透明度。其中一些补救措施很简单,另一些可能代价高昂,但如果不加以改进,金融体系的完整性以及股东和公众的信心都将面临严重受损的风险。