{"title":"Being Unreasonable","authors":"A. Simester","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198853145.003.0012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at the ways in which findings of unreasonableness inform judgements about the culpability of defendants. The chapter suggests that, even without using tracing strategies, it is possible to defend many of the criminal law’s invocations (un)reasonableness in terms of a defendant’s blameworthiness. Sometimes the defendant’s failure to meet an objective standard does reflect a moral vice on her part. The function of the so-called ‘reasonable person’ in this context is really to hold the defendant up to an external standard of moral characteristics. Conversely, if it is to comprise a standard of culpability, the ‘reasonable person’ ought to be personalized to the extent that the defendant’s shortcomings do not disclose moral vices. In particular, and alongside physical limitations, that includes shortcomings of intelligence.","PeriodicalId":405419,"journal":{"name":"Fundamentals of Criminal Law","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-02-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Fundamentals of Criminal Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198853145.003.0012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter looks at the ways in which findings of unreasonableness inform judgements about the culpability of defendants. The chapter suggests that, even without using tracing strategies, it is possible to defend many of the criminal law’s invocations (un)reasonableness in terms of a defendant’s blameworthiness. Sometimes the defendant’s failure to meet an objective standard does reflect a moral vice on her part. The function of the so-called ‘reasonable person’ in this context is really to hold the defendant up to an external standard of moral characteristics. Conversely, if it is to comprise a standard of culpability, the ‘reasonable person’ ought to be personalized to the extent that the defendant’s shortcomings do not disclose moral vices. In particular, and alongside physical limitations, that includes shortcomings of intelligence.