Mind Engineering, Habit, and Human Nature

A. Leonov
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Abstract

This paper attempts to do the following things. First, it reinterprets the notion of “mind engineering” from a more neutral standpoint and offers a totally new approach to the phenomenon. Thus, instead of looking at the phenomenon from a wholly negative perspective (such as identification of mind engineering with “brainwashing,” “mind control” and other manipulatory techniques), it defines mind engineering as the process of “design/redesign, implementation/reimplementation, evaluation/reevaluation of minds.” In itself, this process can be deliberate or forceful. Here, the author looks at deliberate mind engineering primarily. Secondly, the “mind” is defined as a set of beliefs, and the latter, following Charles Peirce, is interpreted as the set of habits. The phenomenon of habit is interpreted pragmatically-hermeneutically and is defined as a “‘fixed’ functional interpretation of the world and one’s place in it that either works or does not work.” If a specific interpretation constantly works, it constitutes a “good” habit. If it does not work, it means a “bad” habit. Unlike the current social-psychological approaches to habit as goal-independent and automatic, and therefore “mindless”/non-cognitive, the author claims that habits are essentially goal-dependent, and cognitive. The habit’s main goal is to resolve the problematic situation that the organism is in. Habit’s cognitive element is grounded in the organism’s interpretive effort that allows it to specify a problematic situation as problematic. Therefore, the connection between the organism and a situation is not direct/immediate but rather is mediated via functional interpretive meaning. In the end, mind engineering must be taken as “habit engineering,” and, thus understood, the phenomenon in question can be seen as one of the key phenomena to clarify human nature.
思维工程、习惯和人性
本文试图做以下事情。首先,它从一个更中立的角度重新解释了“思维工程”的概念,并为这一现象提供了一种全新的方法。因此,它没有从完全消极的角度看待这一现象(比如将思维工程等同于“洗脑”、“思维控制”和其他操纵技术),而是将思维工程定义为“设计/重新设计、实现/再实现、评估/重新评估思维”的过程。就其本身而言,这个过程可以是故意的,也可以是强制的。在这里,作者主要关注蓄意思维工程。其次,“心智”被定义为一套信念,而后者,按照查尔斯·皮尔斯的说法,被解释为一套习惯。习惯现象是用实用解释学来解释的,它被定义为“对世界和一个人在其中的位置的‘固定’功能解释,要么有效,要么无效。”如果一个特定的解释一直有效,它就构成了一个“好”习惯。如果它不起作用,这意味着一个“坏”习惯。与当前社会心理学认为习惯是目标独立的、自动的、因此是“无意识的”/非认知的观点不同,作者声称习惯本质上是目标依赖的、认知的。这个习惯的主要目的是解决机体所处的问题。习惯的认知因素是建立在有机体的解释努力基础上的,它允许它将有问题的情况指定为有问题的。因此,有机体和情境之间的联系不是直接/即时的,而是通过功能解释意义介导的。最后,思维工程必须被视为“习惯工程”,因此,所讨论的现象可以被视为澄清人性的关键现象之一。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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