Competitive Analysis via Benchmark Decomposition

Ning Chen, N. Gravin, P. Lu
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions instead of a individual target benchmark. We consider a multitude of well-studied auction settings, and improve upon a few previous results. Multi-unit auctions. Given a β-competitive unlimited supply auction, the best previously known multi-unit auction is 2β-competitive. We design a (1+β)-competitive auction reducing the ratio from 4.84 to 3.24. These results carry over to matroid and position auctions. General downward-closed environments. We design a 6.5-competitive auction improving upon the ratio of 7.5. Our auction is noticeably simpler than the previous best one. Unlimited supply online auctions. Our analysis yields an auction with a competitive ratio of 4.12, which significantly narrows the margin of [4, 4.84] previously known for this problem. A particularly important tool in our analysis is a simple decomposition lemma, which allows us to bound the competitive ratio against a sum of benchmark functions. We use this lemma in a "divide and conquer" fashion by dividing the target benchmark into the sum of simpler functions.
基于基准分解的竞争分析
我们提出了一种统一的方法来设计和分析无先验竞争性拍卖和在线拍卖。我们的理念是将基准函数视为模型的可变参数,并研究广泛的函数类别,而不是单个目标基准。我们考虑了许多经过充分研究的拍卖设置,并改进了以前的一些结果。多部件拍卖。对于β竞争性无限供给拍卖,已知的最佳多单位拍卖是2β竞争性拍卖。我们设计了一个(1+β)竞争性拍卖,将比率从4.84降低到3.24。这些结果延续到矩阵和位置拍卖。一般向下封闭的环境。我们在7.5的基础上设计了一个6.5的竞争性拍卖。我们的拍卖比之前最好的拍卖要简单得多。无限供应在线拍卖。我们的分析得出了一个竞争比率为4.12的拍卖,这大大缩小了之前已知的这个问题的差距[4,4.84]。在我们的分析中,一个特别重要的工具是一个简单的分解引理,它允许我们将竞争比率与基准函数的总和结合起来。我们以“分而治之”的方式使用这个引理,将目标基准划分为更简单函数的总和。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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