Ending the Federal Reserve from the Bottom Up: Re-Introducing Competitive Currency by State Adherence to Article I, Section 10

William Greene
{"title":"Ending the Federal Reserve from the Bottom Up: Re-Introducing Competitive Currency by State Adherence to Article I, Section 10","authors":"William Greene","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.1570108","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Since its inception, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policies have led to a decline of over 90% in the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar. As a result, there have been several attempts to curtail or eliminate the Federal Reserve’s powers; however, none have proven successful to date, due mainly to the constraints of strong political opposition at the national level.In contrast to these attempts at the national level, this paper proposes an alternative approach to ending the Federal Reserve’s monopoly on money: the “Constitutional Tender Act,” a bill template that can be introduced in every state legislature in the nation, returning each of them to adherence to the U.S. Constitution's “legal tender” provisions of Article I, Section 10. This approach would have a greater likelihood of success for a number of reasons. First, it is decentralized: rather than facing concerted political opposition at a single Federal level, it attacks the issue at the State level, where strategies and tactics can be adapted to the types and amount of political opposition they encounter. Second, it is diffused: it can be attempted in any number of States, which can cause the opposition to spread its resources much more thinly than would be necessary at the Federal level. Finally, it is legally sound: it relies on the U.S. Constitution’s negative mandate in Article I, Section 10, that “No State shall... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”The conclusion is that, in contrast to “top-down” attempts to “end the Fed,” a “bottom-up” approach using “constitutional tender” laws will find greater success.This paper was presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference at the Mises Institute in Auburn, AL, March 13, 2010.","PeriodicalId":166493,"journal":{"name":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-03-13","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Legislation & Statutory Interpretation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.1570108","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

Abstract

Since its inception, the U.S. Federal Reserve’s monetary policies have led to a decline of over 90% in the purchasing power of the U.S. dollar. As a result, there have been several attempts to curtail or eliminate the Federal Reserve’s powers; however, none have proven successful to date, due mainly to the constraints of strong political opposition at the national level.In contrast to these attempts at the national level, this paper proposes an alternative approach to ending the Federal Reserve’s monopoly on money: the “Constitutional Tender Act,” a bill template that can be introduced in every state legislature in the nation, returning each of them to adherence to the U.S. Constitution's “legal tender” provisions of Article I, Section 10. This approach would have a greater likelihood of success for a number of reasons. First, it is decentralized: rather than facing concerted political opposition at a single Federal level, it attacks the issue at the State level, where strategies and tactics can be adapted to the types and amount of political opposition they encounter. Second, it is diffused: it can be attempted in any number of States, which can cause the opposition to spread its resources much more thinly than would be necessary at the Federal level. Finally, it is legally sound: it relies on the U.S. Constitution’s negative mandate in Article I, Section 10, that “No State shall... make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts.”The conclusion is that, in contrast to “top-down” attempts to “end the Fed,” a “bottom-up” approach using “constitutional tender” laws will find greater success.This paper was presented at the Austrian Scholars Conference at the Mises Institute in Auburn, AL, March 13, 2010.
从下至上结束美联储:通过国家遵守第一条第10款重新引入竞争性货币
自成立以来,美联储的货币政策导致美元的购买力下降了90%以上。因此,有几次试图限制或消除美联储的权力;然而,迄今为止,主要由于在国家一级受到强烈政治反对的限制,没有一个证明是成功的。与这些国家层面的尝试相反,本文提出了结束美联储对货币垄断的另一种方法:“宪法招标法”,这是一个可以在全国每个州立法机构引入的法案模板,使每个州都能遵守美国宪法第一条第10款的“法定货币”规定。由于一些原因,这种方法成功的可能性更大。首先,它是分散的:它不是在单一的联邦一级面临一致的政治反对,而是在州一级攻击这个问题,在州一级,战略和战术可以适应他们遇到的政治反对的类型和数量。第二,它是分散的:它可以在任何数量的州进行尝试,这可能导致反对派将其资源分散得比在联邦一级所需要的要少得多。最后,它在法律上是合理的:它依赖于美国宪法第一条第10款的否定授权,即“任何州不得……除金币和银币外,任何东西都可以作为偿还债务的标书。”结论是,与“自上而下”“终结美联储”的尝试相比,使用“宪法招标”法律的“自下而上”方法将取得更大的成功。这篇论文于2010年3月13日在美国奥本米塞斯研究所举行的奥地利学者会议上发表。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信