WHY THE DELIBERATIVE IDEAL JUSTIFIES PUBLICITY – EVEN IF PUBLICITY MAY UNDERMINE DELIBERATION

Abstract

This paper critical assesses those arguments in democratic theory whichdefend the role of secrecy in politics in epistemic terms, that is, by emphasizingsome of the negative effects that publicity in deliberation can have (namely:obscuring the informational process, favoring plebiscitory rhetorics, and replacingopen discussion with conformist behaviors and/or bargaining). Based upon theanalysis of the 2010-2011 Belgian Sixth State Reform, the paper argues that, evenif publicity can produce negative effects on deliberation, it cannot be proven thatthese effects are more severe than those produced by a closed-doors deliberation.Furthermore, it argues that an epistemic justification of closed-door deliberationcould not be accepted by a reasonable citizen: the justification of publicity does notrely on its epistemic positive effects, but on the fact that the assessment anddefinition of these cannot be left to the negotiating parties.