Analysis of power transaction by solving Nash Equilibrium in electricity markets with Financial Transmission Rights

Jae-Hong Shin, Sang-Hoon Kim, Kwang-ho Lee
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Abstract

This paper looks at the influence of Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) on the market value(Social Welfare; SW) in the competitive electricity market. The transmission line constraints make it difficult to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE) due to causing a mixed strategy NE instead of a pure strategy NE. Computing a mixed strategy is more complicated in a multi-player game. The aim of this paper are to compute a mixed strategy NE and analyze SW in power transaction with FTRs. This paper introduces a formula and a technique for solving NE of multi-player game with FTRs. A formula based on two heuristics is introduced for finding a mixed strategy NE in a multiplayer game depending on the network configuration. The heuristics are based on empirical studies of mixed strategies in numerous sample systems. Also, to verify that the solution of the numerical results is a NE, we show numerical results for the marginal profits of the electricity market. Finally, this paper proposed that SW is the smallest when generation company with the smallest PTDF holds the transmission rights.
基于金融传输权的电力市场纳什均衡分析电力交易
本文研究了金融传导权对市场价值的影响(社会福利;在竞争激烈的电力市场。传输线约束使得纳什均衡(NE)的计算变得困难,因为它产生了混合策略NE而不是纯策略NE。在多人游戏中计算混合策略更为复杂。本文的目的是计算一个混合策略网元,并分析带有ftr的电力交易中的SW。本文介绍了一种求解带有ftr的多人博弈NE的公式和技术。介绍了一个基于两种启发式的公式,用于在多人博弈中根据网络配置寻找混合策略网元。启发式是基于大量样本系统中混合策略的实证研究。此外,为了验证数值结果的解是NE,我们给出了电力市场边际利润的数值结果。最后,本文提出当PTDF最小的发电公司拥有输电权时,SW最小。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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