Safety Analysis of Ranging Biases on the WAAS GEOs

T. Walter, J. Blanch, E. Altshuler
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One such error results from incoherence between the code and the carrier signals. Unlike GPS, the GEO signals are generated on the ground and have to traverse the ionosphere both on the way up from the ground uplink station (GUS) to the GEO and then on the way down from the GEO to the user. The GUS electronics may not always be able to keep the two components perfectly aligned. This results in a code-carrier incoherency (CCI) that creates a varying error for users with different smoothing times. A user whose carrier smoothing filter has converged will see a different effect from a user who has not smoothed their code measurements with carrier data [2]. When WAAS generates a confidence bound on the ranging accuracy of the GEO satellites, it must account for all different users and for every error source. Unfortunately, the protection level equations used by WAAS do not support the inclusion of bias terms or terms to account for different smoothing times [8]. Therefore, WAAS must conduct special analyses to bound these biases. This paper describes the analysis WAAS performs to ensure that the UDRE it broadcasts for each GEO safely bounds all users for all possible bias errors. This analysis accounts for other fault modes that may also be present, but not yet detected by the WAAS integrity monitors. Versions of GEO bias analyses have existed since before WAAS was commissioned in 2003. The analysis has been updated and significantly improved since those early more conservative approaches. WAAS is in the midst of replacing all three of its GEOs and will briefly have four operational ranging GEOs in the summer of 2019. Pseudorange bias terms can lead to much bigger user position errors when there are more such terms that may all align. This WAAS GEO bias analysis has been recently updated and each new GEO has been carefully examined to ensure the continued safe operation of GEO ranging. This paper describes this analysis and demonstrates the safety and performance of the new WAAS GEOs Error Bounding Analysis Because the broadcast sigmas (User Differential Range Error (UDRE) and Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE)) are larger than the actual overbounds, constant biases up to a certain magnitude can be tolerated by the user. The analysis in this paper seeks to find the maximum tolerable biases that can be present for arbitrary geometries. The analysis in this paper examines seven cases listed in Table 1. All seven cases must pass and each case itself has numerous subcases testing different UDREI and GIVEI values. Further the risk is evaluated against three user protection level calculations: the vertical and horizontal precision approach (PA) protection levels and the non-precision approach (NPA) horizontal protection level. Table 1: GEO Bias Threat Cases from Case Number Description Ionospheric State Faulted SV 1 Fault-free Performance Both Nominal and Storm None 2 CCC Fault Nominal-only GPS 3 CCC Fault Nominal-only GEO 4 SQM Fault Nominal-only GPS 5 SQM Fault Nominal-only GEO 6 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GPS 7 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GEO The fault cases evaluate whether faults will be safely detected even in the presence of the unfaulted GEO biases. Probability of Position Error Exceeding the Protection Level The purpose of the GEO Bias gaussian bounding analysis is to ensure that the broadcast UDRE and GIVE values are at least as large enough to bound the user’s actual errors. 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Abstract

The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) [1] has found that the ranging signals from its geostationary (GEO) satellites can significantly improve the availability of vertical guidance, particularly in Alaska and at times when not all GPS satellites are operational. However, WAAS has also observed that the GEO ranging sources can be affected by errors that are bias-like in their behavior [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]. Such errors do not change values randomly but may persist with a particular sign and magnitude for many hours or longer. Some of these bias errors commonly affect our reference receivers and may thus be difficult to observe and bound in real time. Others are readily observable but not necessarily easy to eliminate as they may impact user receivers differently. One such error results from incoherence between the code and the carrier signals. Unlike GPS, the GEO signals are generated on the ground and have to traverse the ionosphere both on the way up from the ground uplink station (GUS) to the GEO and then on the way down from the GEO to the user. The GUS electronics may not always be able to keep the two components perfectly aligned. This results in a code-carrier incoherency (CCI) that creates a varying error for users with different smoothing times. A user whose carrier smoothing filter has converged will see a different effect from a user who has not smoothed their code measurements with carrier data [2]. When WAAS generates a confidence bound on the ranging accuracy of the GEO satellites, it must account for all different users and for every error source. Unfortunately, the protection level equations used by WAAS do not support the inclusion of bias terms or terms to account for different smoothing times [8]. Therefore, WAAS must conduct special analyses to bound these biases. This paper describes the analysis WAAS performs to ensure that the UDRE it broadcasts for each GEO safely bounds all users for all possible bias errors. This analysis accounts for other fault modes that may also be present, but not yet detected by the WAAS integrity monitors. Versions of GEO bias analyses have existed since before WAAS was commissioned in 2003. The analysis has been updated and significantly improved since those early more conservative approaches. WAAS is in the midst of replacing all three of its GEOs and will briefly have four operational ranging GEOs in the summer of 2019. Pseudorange bias terms can lead to much bigger user position errors when there are more such terms that may all align. This WAAS GEO bias analysis has been recently updated and each new GEO has been carefully examined to ensure the continued safe operation of GEO ranging. This paper describes this analysis and demonstrates the safety and performance of the new WAAS GEOs Error Bounding Analysis Because the broadcast sigmas (User Differential Range Error (UDRE) and Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE)) are larger than the actual overbounds, constant biases up to a certain magnitude can be tolerated by the user. The analysis in this paper seeks to find the maximum tolerable biases that can be present for arbitrary geometries. The analysis in this paper examines seven cases listed in Table 1. All seven cases must pass and each case itself has numerous subcases testing different UDREI and GIVEI values. Further the risk is evaluated against three user protection level calculations: the vertical and horizontal precision approach (PA) protection levels and the non-precision approach (NPA) horizontal protection level. Table 1: GEO Bias Threat Cases from Case Number Description Ionospheric State Faulted SV 1 Fault-free Performance Both Nominal and Storm None 2 CCC Fault Nominal-only GPS 3 CCC Fault Nominal-only GEO 4 SQM Fault Nominal-only GPS 5 SQM Fault Nominal-only GEO 6 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GPS 7 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GEO The fault cases evaluate whether faults will be safely detected even in the presence of the unfaulted GEO biases. Probability of Position Error Exceeding the Protection Level The purpose of the GEO Bias gaussian bounding analysis is to ensure that the broadcast UDRE and GIVE values are at least as large enough to bound the user’s actual errors. This can be written mathematically as:
WAAS geo测距偏差的安全性分析
广域增强系统(WAAS)[1]发现,来自其地球同步卫星(GEO)的测距信号可以显著提高垂直制导的可用性,特别是在阿拉斯加和并非所有GPS卫星都能运行的时候。然而,WAAS也观察到GEO测距源在其行为上可能受到类似偏差的误差的影响[2][3][4][5][6][7]。这种误差不会随机改变值,但可能以特定的符号和大小持续数小时或更长时间。这些偏差中的一些通常会影响我们的参考接收器,因此可能难以实时观察和绑定。其他一些很容易观察到,但不一定容易消除,因为它们可能对用户接收者产生不同的影响。其中一种错误是由编码和载波信号之间的不相干引起的。与GPS不同的是,GEO信号是在地面产生的,在从地面上行站(GUS)上升到GEO的过程中,以及在从GEO下降到用户的过程中,都必须穿越电离层。GUS电子器件可能并不总是能够保持两个组件完美对齐。这就导致了代码载波不一致性(CCI),对使用不同平滑时间的用户产生不同的误差。如果用户的载波平滑滤波器已经收敛,那么用户看到的效果将与没有使用载波数据平滑代码度量的用户不同[2]。当WAAS对地球同步轨道卫星的测距精度产生置信边界时,它必须考虑到所有不同的用户和每个误差源。不幸的是,WAAS使用的保护等级方程不支持包含偏置项或考虑不同平滑时间的项[8]。因此,WAAS必须进行特殊的分析来约束这些偏差。本文描述了WAAS执行的分析,以确保它为每个GEO广播的UDRE安全约束所有用户的所有可能的偏差误差。此分析考虑了其他可能存在但尚未被WAAS完整性监视器检测到的故障模式。在WAAS于2003年启用之前,GEO偏差分析的版本就已经存在了。自从那些早期比较保守的方法以来,这种分析已经得到了更新和显著改进。WAAS正在更换其所有三个geo,并将在2019年夏天短暂地拥有四个可运行的测距geo。当有更多可能对齐的伪偏差项时,可能会导致更大的用户位置误差。这个WAAS GEO偏差分析最近更新了,每个新的GEO都经过仔细检查,以确保GEO测距的持续安全运行。由于广播信号(用户差分距离误差(UDRE)和栅格电离层垂直误差(GIVE))大于实际越界,因此用户可以容忍一定幅度的恒定偏差。本文的分析旨在找出任意几何存在的最大可容忍偏差。本文的分析考察了表1所列的七个案例。所有七个用例都必须通过,并且每个用例本身都有许多子用例测试不同的UDREI和GIVEI值。此外,根据三种用户保护级别计算评估风险:垂直和水平精确方法(PA)保护级别以及非精确方法(NPA)水平保护级别。表1:来自案例数量的威胁案例描述电离层状态故障SV 1无故障性能标称和风暴无2 CCC Fault Nominal-only GPS 3 CCC Fault Nominal-only GEO 4 SQM Fault Nominal-only GPS 5 SQM Fault Nominal-only GEO 6 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GPS 7 UDRE Fault Nominal-only GEO故障案例评估即使在没有故障的GEO偏差存在的情况下,故障是否会被安全检测到。GEO偏置高斯边界分析的目的是确保广播的UDRE和GIVE值至少足够大,以约束用户的实际误差。这在数学上可以写成:
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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