Analysis of Game Model and Strategy of EPC General Contractor and Subcontractor

Guangmei Cao, Liping Zhao, Yuesen Wang, Honghu Gao
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This paper conducted in-depth research of behavior motivation of EPC general contractor and the subcontractor by using the game theory, systematically analyzed all kinds of game models that may appeared during the cooperation of general contractor and subcontractor. It also revealed the essence of “Prisoner’s Dilemma “Deer’s Trap” and unilateral promises. Finally, this paper introduced the credit accumulation and long-term benefits, which would affect general contractor and subcontractor decisions during repeated games, and they will reach “win-win situation” of Pareto efficiency and stable cooperation relationship. This study provides the important basis for the healthy development of the EPC model and for the cooperative relationship decision making for construction enterprises.
EPC总承包与分包商的博弈模型与策略分析
本文运用博弈论对EPC总包商与分包商的行为动机进行了深入研究,系统分析了总包商与分包商合作过程中可能出现的各种博弈模型。它也揭示了“囚徒困境”、“鹿的陷阱”和单边承诺的本质。最后,本文介绍了在重复博弈过程中,总包商和分包商的信用积累和长期利益会影响双方的决策,从而达到帕累托效率和稳定合作关系的“双赢”。本研究为EPC模式的健康发展和施工企业的合作关系决策提供了重要依据。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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