{"title":"Iraq and Afghanistan Compared","authors":"Christopher D. Kolenda","doi":"10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0039","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter compares the insights from both case studies to show how the lack of war termination terminology led the U.S. to adopt myopic strategies aimed at decisive victory while ignoring the critical factors for such victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military invasion gave way to predatory governments, but the U.S. was slow to revise its strategy. Cognitive biases, bureaucratic silos, and patron-client issues led the U.S. to stick with strategies and ignore adverse signs. When the U.S. wanted to withdraw from those countries, bargaining asymmetries left them in a weak position, forcing them to withdraw without having achieved a durable and favorable outcome. By comparing those two cases, the chapter highlights the systemic nature of these problems.","PeriodicalId":235305,"journal":{"name":"Zero-Sum Victory","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Zero-Sum Victory","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813152769.003.0039","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter compares the insights from both case studies to show how the lack of war termination terminology led the U.S. to adopt myopic strategies aimed at decisive victory while ignoring the critical factors for such victory. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. military invasion gave way to predatory governments, but the U.S. was slow to revise its strategy. Cognitive biases, bureaucratic silos, and patron-client issues led the U.S. to stick with strategies and ignore adverse signs. When the U.S. wanted to withdraw from those countries, bargaining asymmetries left them in a weak position, forcing them to withdraw without having achieved a durable and favorable outcome. By comparing those two cases, the chapter highlights the systemic nature of these problems.