A holistic approach to service survivability

SSRS '03 Pub Date : 2003-10-31 DOI:10.1145/1036921.1036923
A. Keromytis, Janak J. Parekh, Philip Gross, G. Kaiser, V. Misra, Jason Nieh, D. Rubenstein, S. Stolfo
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引用次数: 58

Abstract

We present SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block, Evade, React), a proposed survivability architecture that blocks, evades and reacts to a variety of attacks by using several security and survivability mechanisms in an automated and coordinated fashion. Contrary to the ad hoc manner in which contemporary survivable systems are built-using isolated, independent security mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and software sandboxes-SABER integrates several different technologies in an attempt to provide a unified framework for responding to the wide range of attacks malicious insiders and outsiders can launch. This coordinated multi-layer approach will be capable of defending against attacks targeted at various levels of the network stack, such as congestion-based DoS attacks, software-based DoS or code-injection attacks, and others. Our fundamental insight is that while multiple lines of defense are useful, most conventional, uncoordinated approaches fail to exploit the full range of available responses to incidents. By coordinating the response, the ability to survive successful security breaches increases substantially. We discuss the key components of SABER, how they will be integrated together, and how we can leverage on the promising results of the individual components to improve survivability in a variety of coordinated attack scenarios. SABER is currently in the prototyping stages, with several interesting open research topics.
服务可生存性的整体方法
我们提出了SABER(生存性架构:阻止、逃避、反应),这是一种提议的生存性架构,通过使用几种安全和生存性机制,以自动化和协调的方式阻止、逃避和响应各种攻击。与当代可生存系统的临时构建方式相反——使用隔离的、独立的安全机制,如防火墙、入侵检测系统和软件沙箱——saber集成了几种不同的技术,试图提供一个统一的框架,以响应恶意内部人员和外部人员可能发起的各种攻击。这种协调的多层方法将能够防御针对网络堆栈各个级别的攻击,例如基于拥塞的DoS攻击、基于软件的DoS或代码注入攻击等。我们的基本见解是,虽然多道防线是有用的,但大多数传统的、不协调的方法无法利用对事件的全部可用反应。通过协调响应,成功抵御安全漏洞的能力将大大提高。我们讨论了SABER的关键组件,它们将如何集成在一起,以及我们如何利用各个组件的有希望的结果来提高各种协同攻击场景中的生存能力。SABER目前处于原型阶段,有几个有趣的开放研究课题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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