Security-Minded Verification of Space Systems

C. Maple, M. Bradbury, Hu Yuan, M. Farrell, C. Dixon, M. Fisher, U. Atmaca
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

Modern space systems are increasing in complexity. The advent of the Internet of Space Things, coupled with the commercialisation of space has resulted in an ecosystem that is difficult to control and brings about new security challenges. In such critical systems, it is common to conduct verification strategies to ensure that the underpinning software is correct. Formal verification is achieved by modelling the system and verifying that the model obeys particular functional and safety properties. Many connected systems are now the target of a variety of threat actors attempting to realise different goals. Threat modelling is the approach employed to analyse and manage the threats from adversaries. Common practice is that these two approaches are conducted independently of one another. In this paper, we argue that the two should be mutually informed, and describe a methodology for security-minded formal verification that combines these analysis techniques. This approach will streamline the development process and give a more formal grounding to the security properties identified during threat analysis.
空间系统的安全验证
现代空间系统的复杂性日益增加。空间物联网的出现,加上空间商业化,形成了一个难以控制的生态系统,带来了新的安全挑战。在这样的关键系统中,通常执行验证策略以确保基础软件是正确的。正式验证是通过对系统建模并验证模型是否符合特定的功能和安全属性来实现的。许多连接的系统现在成为各种威胁行为者试图实现不同目标的目标。威胁建模是用来分析和管理来自对手的威胁的方法。通常的做法是,这两种方法是相互独立进行的。在本文中,我们认为两者应该相互通知,并描述了一种结合这些分析技术的具有安全意识的正式验证的方法。这种方法将简化开发过程,并为在威胁分析期间确定的安全属性提供更正式的基础。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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