India's Goods and Services Tax: A Unique Experiment in Cooperative Federalism and a Constitutional Crisis in Waiting

A. Kir
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

It has long been argued that federal countries, especially those with strong subnational taxing powers, might face difficulty in implementing a federal value-added tax (VAT) because of coordination issues involved, and therefore might be reluctant to adopt one. This article provides insights on how VAT structures are evolving in federal systems, where different tiers of government have separate (and sometimes overlapping) taxation powers. While the author focuses mainly on India's recently enacted goods and services tax (GST), he also offers a comparative perspective, with reference to the GST/VAT systems in Canada, Brazil, and the European Union, thus adding to the hitherto limited body of scholarly work on VAT coordination in federal jurisdictions. The GST is arguably India's biggest tax reform in several decades. Introduced primarily to create a unified national market and bring an end to tax wars and economic distortions, the tax reform's chief slogan was "GST—one-nation-one-tax-one-market." This article takes a closer look at a unique institutional design feature of the Indian GST—a centre-state body called the GST council. What makes this body unique is that it is envisaged as functioning on the principles of cooperative federalism. But can a concurrent tax system, whose very survival is based on cooperative federalism, guarantee a unified national market? If yes, for how long? The author highlights the role of the GST council in market integration and explains why the council has succeeded on several fronts while failing on others. He also addresses an unresolved constitutional issue that could affect the GST council's ability to function as the fulcrum for cooperative federalism—namely, the question of whether its decisions are binding. The uncertainty surrounding this issue could lead to a constitutional crisis if one or more states decide to opt out. The author discusses four possible ways to deal with this impending crisis.
印度的商品和服务税:合作联邦制的独特实验和等待中的宪法危机
长期以来,人们一直认为,联邦制国家,特别是那些拥有强大的地方税收权力的国家,在实施联邦增值税(VAT)时可能会面临困难,因为涉及到协调问题,因此可能不愿意采用一种增值税。本文提供了关于增值税结构如何在联邦系统中演变的见解,在联邦系统中,不同级别的政府拥有单独(有时重叠)的税收权力。虽然作者主要关注印度最近颁布的商品和服务税(GST),但他也提供了一个比较的视角,参考了加拿大、巴西和欧盟的商品和服务税/增值税制度,从而增加了迄今为止有限的联邦管辖范围内增值税协调的学术工作。商品及服务税可以说是印度几十年来最大的税收改革。主要是为了建立一个统一的全国市场,结束税收战争和经济扭曲,税制改革的主要口号是“一国一税一市场”。本文仔细研究了印度商品及服务税的一个独特的制度设计特征——一个被称为商品及服务税委员会的中央国家机构。这个机构的独特之处在于,它被设想按照合作联邦制的原则运作。但是,一个以合作联邦制为生存基础的并行税制能保证一个统一的全国市场吗?如果是,多长时间?作者强调了商品及服务税理事会在市场一体化中的作用,并解释了为什么理事会在几个方面取得了成功,而在其他方面却失败了。他还提到了一个尚未解决的宪法问题,该问题可能会影响GST委员会作为合作联邦制支点的能力,即其决定是否具有约束力的问题。如果一个或多个州决定退出,围绕这一问题的不确定性可能导致宪法危机。作者讨论了应对这一迫在眉睫的危机的四种可能的方法。
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