Timing Side-Channel Attack Resistant Key Derivation Functions for Cryptosystems

Abstract

In today’s digital world, security is required at each level of the implementation, even for Cryptographic algorithms, as we depend digitally on various needs of our daily life. Also, hackers are trying many ways to hack confidential information, and side-channel attacks are one of them. Key Derivation Functions (KDFs) are the basic and essential components of cryptographic systems; therefore, their security becomes more crucial for such systems. This paper presents the implementation of KDFs based on Block Ciphers and Hash functions (AES-128 and SHA-256, SHA- 512). The key feature of this implementation is that it generates a unique and secure key. Moreover, the generated key is less prone to the Timing side-channel attacks. These KDFs are implemented using high-level language C in Xilinx Vivado HLS. The results show that the proposed design offers a highly secure generated key while mitigating the Timing side-channel attacks possibility. Security analysis is done in terms of Hamming Distance and Avalanche Effects. The reported KDF based on AES-128 operates at 152.3 MHz with a max throughput of 9.728 Gbps, whereas KDF based on Hash Function, i.e., SHA-256 and SHA-512, operate at 108.6 MHz and 118.1 MHz with the max throughput of 2.28 Mbps and 2.28 Mbps, respectively.