Application-Layer DDoS Defense with Reinforcement Learning

Abstract

Application-layer distributed denial-of-service (L7 DDoS) attacks, by exploiting application-layer requests to overwhelm functions or components of victim servers, have become a rising major threat to today's Internet. However, because the traffic from an L7 DDoS attack appears legitimate in transport and network layers, it is difficult for traditional DDoS solutions to detect and defend against an L7 DDoS attack. In this paper, we propose a new, reinforcement-learning-based approach to L7 DDoS attack defense. We introduce a multiobjective reward function to guide a reinforcement learning agent to learn the most suitable action in mitigating L7 DDoS attacks. Consequently, while actively monitoring and analyzing the victim server, the agent can apply different strategies under different conditions to protect the victim: When an L7 DDoS attack is overwhelming, the agent will aggressively mitigate as many malicious requests as possible, thereby keeping the victim server functioning (even at the cost of sacrificing a small number of legitimate requests); otherwise, the agent will conservatively mitigate malicious requests instead, with a focus on minimizing collateral damage to legitimate requests. The evaluation shows that our approach can achieve minimal collateral damage when the L7 DDoS attack is tolerable and mitigate 98.73 % of the malicious application messages when the victim is brought to its knees.