Individual Fairness in Prophet Inequalities

Makis Arsenis, Robert D. Kleinberg
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

Prophet inequalities are performance guarantees for online algorithms (a.k.a. stopping rules) solving the following ''hiring problem'': a decision maker sequentially inspects candidates whose values are independent random numbers and is asked to hire at most one candidate by selecting it before inspecting the values of future candidates in the sequence. A classic result in optimal stopping theory asserts that there exist stopping rules guaranteeing that the decision maker will hire a candidate whose expected value is at least half as good as the expected value of the candidate hired by a ''prophet,'' i.e.one who has simultaneous access to the realizations of all candidates' values. Such stopping rules may indeed have provably good performance but might treat individual candidates unfairly in a number of different ways. In this work we identify two types of individual fairness that might be desirable in optimal stopping problems. We call them identity-independent fairness (IIF) and time-independent fairness (TIF) and give precise definitions in the context of the hiring problem. We give polynomial-time algorithms for finding the optimal IIF/TIF stopping rules for a given instance with discrete support and we manage to recover a prophet inequality with factor 1/2 when the decision maker's stopping rule is required to satisfy both fairness properties while the prophet is unconstrained. We also explore worst-case ratios between optimal selection rules in the presence vs. absence of individual fairness constraints, in both the online and offline settings. We prove an impossibility result showing that there is no prophet inequality with a non-zero factor for either IIF or TIF stopping rules when we further constrain the decision maker to make a hire with probability 1. We finally consider a setting in which the decision maker doesn't know the distributions of candidates' values but has access to a bounded number of independent samples from each distribution. We provide constant-competitive algorithms that satisfy both TIF and IIF, using one sample from each distribution in the offline setting and two samples from each distribution in the online setting. The full version of the paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.10302v1
先知不平等中的个人公平
先知不等式是解决以下“招聘问题”的在线算法(又名停止规则)的性能保证:决策者依次检查值为独立随机数的候选人,并被要求在检查序列中未来候选人的值之前选择最多雇用一个候选人。最优停止理论的一个经典结果断言,存在停止规则,保证决策者将雇用的候选人的期望值至少是“先知”所雇用的候选人的期望值的一半,即同时获得所有候选人价值观实现的人。这样的停止规则可能确实有良好的表现,但可能在许多不同的方面对个别候选人不公平。在这项工作中,我们确定了在最优停止问题中可能需要的两种类型的个体公平性。我们将其称为身份无关公平(IIF)和时间无关公平(TIF),并在招聘问题的背景下给出了精确的定义。我们给出了寻找具有离散支持的给定实例的最优IIF/TIF停止规则的多项式时间算法,并且我们设法恢复了一个因子为1/2的先知不等式,当要求决策者的停止规则同时满足公平性,而先知是无约束的。我们还探讨了在线和离线设置中,在存在与不存在个人公平约束的情况下,最优选择规则之间的最坏情况比率。我们证明了一个不可能的结果,即当我们进一步约束决策者以概率为1进行雇佣时,IIF和TIF停止规则都不存在非零因子的先知不等式。最后,我们考虑这样一种情况:决策者不知道候选值的分布,但可以从每个分布中获得有限数量的独立样本。我们提供了满足TIF和IIF的恒定竞争算法,在离线设置中使用来自每个分布的一个样本,在在线设置中使用来自每个分布的两个样本。论文的完整版本:https://arxiv.org/abs/2205.10302v1
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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