{"title":"On the Infrastructure Providers That Support Misinformation Websites","authors":"Catherine Han, Deepak Kumar, Z. Durumeric","doi":"10.1609/icwsm.v16i1.19292","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper, we analyze the service providers that power 440 misinformation and hate sites, including hosting platforms, domain registrars, CDN providers, DDoS protection companies, advertising networks, donation processors, and e-mail providers. We find that several providers are disproportionately responsible for serving misinformation websites, most prominently Cloudflare. We further show that misinformation sites disproportionately rely on several popular ad networks and payment processors, including RevContent and Google DoubleClick. When misinformation websites are deplatformed by hosting providers, DDoS protection services, and registrars, sites nearly always resurface through alternative providers. However, anecdotally, we find that sites struggle to remain online when mainstream monetization channels are severed. We conclude with insights for infrastructure providers and researchers working to stem the spread of misinformation and hate content.","PeriodicalId":175641,"journal":{"name":"International Conference on Web and Social Media","volume":"s3-38 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"12","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Conference on Web and Social Media","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1609/icwsm.v16i1.19292","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 12
Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the service providers that power 440 misinformation and hate sites, including hosting platforms, domain registrars, CDN providers, DDoS protection companies, advertising networks, donation processors, and e-mail providers. We find that several providers are disproportionately responsible for serving misinformation websites, most prominently Cloudflare. We further show that misinformation sites disproportionately rely on several popular ad networks and payment processors, including RevContent and Google DoubleClick. When misinformation websites are deplatformed by hosting providers, DDoS protection services, and registrars, sites nearly always resurface through alternative providers. However, anecdotally, we find that sites struggle to remain online when mainstream monetization channels are severed. We conclude with insights for infrastructure providers and researchers working to stem the spread of misinformation and hate content.