The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the Trojan Horse

Y. Radi
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引用次数: 46

Abstract

Contracting states bring a Trojan Horse into the city when providing for most-favoured-nation clauses (MFN clause) in bilateral investment treaties (BIT). This affects the general equilibrium of the treaties, as recent case law from investment arbitration tribunals illustrates. In these cases the controversial issue is the applicability of the MFN clause to the dispute settlement provisions of the BITs. Arbitration practice and mainstream literature so far have focussed on the specific nature of the dispute settlement mechanism, asking whether the MFN clause should cover it or not. This article analyses the arguments put forward so far on this issue, and argues that by reason of the effet utile the MFN clause always covers the dispute settlement mechanism, unless the opposite intention of the Contracting states can be demonstrated. Furthermore, this article considers that the prevailing focus on the entire mechanism is misleading. The main issue is in fact the scope of application of the MFN clause to the individual provisions on dispute settlement. Underlying this issue there is the tension between the MFN clause and the other provisions of BITs, whatever their procedural or substantive nature. This tension puts into question the rationality of providing for MFN clauses in bilateral investment treaties. But once such a clause is already adopted, this article suggests that the way to domesticate this Trojan Horse is to substitute conditional MFN clauses for the unconditional MFN clauses presently provided for in BITs.
最惠国待遇条款在双边投资协定争端解决条款中的适用:驯养特洛伊木马
缔约国在双边投资协定(BIT)中规定最惠国条款(MFN条款)时,给城市带来了特洛伊木马。正如最近投资仲裁法庭的判例法所表明的那样,这影响了条约的一般平衡。在这些情况下,有争议的问题是最惠国条款适用于双边投资协定的争端解决规定。迄今为止,仲裁实践和主流文献都集中在争端解决机制的具体性质上,询问最惠国条款是否应涵盖该机制。本文分析了迄今为止关于这一问题的争论,认为由于效力的原因,最惠国条款总是涵盖争端解决机制,除非能证明缔约国的相反意图。此外,本文认为对整个机制的普遍关注具有误导性。主要问题实际上是最惠国条款适用于关于解决争端的个别条款的范围。在这个问题的基础上,存在着最惠国待遇条款与双边投资协定的其他条款之间的紧张关系,无论其程序性或实质性性质如何。这种紧张关系使人怀疑在双边投资条约中规定最惠国待遇条款的合理性。但是,一旦这样的条款已经被采用,本文建议驯化这一特洛伊木马的方法是用条件最惠国待遇条款取代目前在双边投资协定中规定的无条件最惠国待遇条款。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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