RandHeap: Heap Randomization for Mitigating Heap Spray Attacks in Virtual Machines

Abhinav Jangda, Mohit Mishra
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Abstract

Virtual machines are an integral component of our present software systems infrastructure, including the web, and are here to stay. Web browsers like Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox uses virtual machines to execute JavaScript code. Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) use just-in-time compilers to compile Java byte code to machine code. However, with the increasing use of virtual machines, they are also susceptible to security attacks. One such class of attack is the heap spray attack, wherein the attacker populates the heap with malicious code and exploits a vulnerability to jump to the populated malicious code in the heap, thereby enabling arbitrary code execution. In this paper, we present RandHeap, a technique to randomize the heap layout to detect and prevent heap spray attacks. RandHeap randomizes the heap in three different ways: (i) by randomizing object layout, (ii) by randomizing array layout, and (iii) by encrypting data stored on the heap. Using RandHeap, we were able to detect and prevent several heap spray attacks. For the evaluation of RandHeap, we implemented the concept of RandHeap in Google V8 and JikesRVM. We executed Octane 2.0 Benchmarks on Google V8 and Dacapo 9.12 Benchmarks on JikesRVM. Observations show that heap randomization using RandHeap is accompanied with low overhead and modest memory requirement. We implemented heap spraying attacks in Google V8 and JikesRVM and found that RandHeap was able to detect and prevent the attacks successfully.
RandHeap:用于减轻虚拟机堆喷雾攻击的堆随机化
虚拟机是我们目前的软件系统基础设施的一个组成部分,包括网络,并将继续存在。像b谷歌Chrome和Mozilla Firefox这样的Web浏览器使用虚拟机来执行JavaScript代码。Java虚拟机(jvm)使用即时编译器将Java字节码编译为机器码。然而,随着虚拟机使用的增加,它们也容易受到安全攻击。其中一类攻击是堆喷射攻击,攻击者用恶意代码填充堆,并利用漏洞跳转到堆中填充的恶意代码,从而允许任意代码执行。在本文中,我们提出了RandHeap,一种随机化堆布局来检测和防止堆喷雾攻击的技术。RandHeap以三种不同的方式随机化堆:(i)随机化对象布局,(ii)随机化数组布局,(iii)加密存储在堆上的数据。使用RandHeap,我们能够检测和防止几种堆喷射攻击。对于RandHeap的评估,我们在谷歌V8和JikesRVM中实现了RandHeap的概念。我们在谷歌V8上执行Octane 2.0基准测试,在JikesRVM上执行Dacapo 9.12基准测试。观察表明,使用RandHeap进行堆随机化具有低开销和适度的内存需求。我们在b谷歌V8和JikesRVM中实现了堆喷涂攻击,发现RandHeap能够成功检测并阻止攻击。
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