Feyerabend, Science and Scientism

I. Kidd
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Paul Feyerabend (1924–1994) acquired a variety of epithets during the latter stage of his career. The most persistent is perhaps Nature’s description of him as ‘the worst enemy of science’, later adopted as the title of an important collection of essays in his honour. The label encapsulates his bad reputation, at least within philosophy of science, which can be divided roughly into two aspects. The first are criticisms of the actual or perceived content of his work, most usually that he was, at least at certain points in his career, anti-science, propseudoscience and a radical relativist or perhaps post-modernist. Some of these can be easily rebutted. Considered closely, the putative ‘defences’ of astrology, parapsychology, witchcraft and alternative medicine turn out to be nothing of the sort (Kidd 2013, 2016a, 2018). His general strategy was to point out the epistemic failings of those scientists who dismissed such beliefs and practices without any properly informed understanding of them. Astrology was ‘bunk’, he argued, but one needs better arguments against it than those typically offered by those whose social authority owes to their elevated epistemic standing. In the case of relativism and other alleged philosophical sins, recent work by Martin Kusch (2016) and Lisa Heller (2016) tell a more complex story: the ultra-relativism of Science in a Free Society modulated, slowly, into those thirteen ‘relativistic theses’ in Farewell to Reason, most then rejected by the time of Conquest of Abundance. Similarly, there are no good reasons to regard him as a post-modernist, at least on three substantive characterisations of that capacious term (Kidd 2016b). As to the other charge – that Feyerabend was ‘anti-science’ – refuting that is the aim of this chapter. The second aspect of Feyerabend’s bad reputation is less easily disposed of, since it is rooted in criticisms of his professional conduct. Certainly, polemic, rhetoric and a jocular tone are not to everyone’s taste, but there
费耶阿本德,科学与科学主义
保罗·费耶阿本德(1924-1994)在其职业生涯的后期获得了各种各样的绰号。最经久不衰的或许是《自然》杂志对他的描述:“科学最坏的敌人”,后来一本纪念他的重要文集也以此为标题。这个标签概括了他的坏名声,至少在科学哲学领域是这样,这可以大致分为两个方面。第一种是对他作品的实际或感知内容的批评,最常见的是,至少在他职业生涯的某些时候,他是反科学、伪科学和激进的相对主义者,或者可能是后现代主义者。其中一些观点很容易被反驳。仔细考虑一下,占星术、超心理学、巫术和替代医学的所谓“防御”被证明根本不是这样(Kidd 2013, 2016a, 2018)。他的总体策略是指出那些在对这些信仰和实践没有任何适当了解的情况下就否定它们的科学家的认识失误。他认为占星术是“胡说八道”,但人们需要更好的论据来反对占星术,而不是那些社会权威归功于他们的高认知地位的人所提供的典型论据。就相对主义和其他所谓的哲学罪而言,马丁·库什(Martin Kusch, 2016)和丽莎·海勒(Lisa Heller, 2016)最近的作品讲述了一个更复杂的故事:《自由社会中的科学》的超相对主义慢慢地被调整为《告别理性》中的13个“相对主义论点”,其中大部分在《征服富足》时代被拒绝。同样,没有充分的理由将他视为后现代主义者,至少在这个宽泛的术语的三个实质性特征上(Kidd 2016b)。至于另一项指控——费耶阿本德是“反科学”——反驳这是本章的目的。费耶阿本德坏名声的第二个方面就不那么容易处理了,因为它植根于对他职业行为的批评。当然,争论、修辞和诙谐的语气并不符合每个人的口味,但确实如此
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