Majority Rule, Democracy and Populism: Theoretical Considerations

Abstract

This short chapter, a contribution to a volume on the rule of law versus majoritarian democracy, argues that simple majority rule, without any constraints or qualifications, cannot qualify as a sufficient account of democracy in the morally and politically attractive sense of the term. The argument proceeds as follows: first, I reflect upon the best rationales for the majority rule, and eliminate some obviously non-persuasive rationales (such as efficiency, simplicity, and intuitive judgments). Second, I argue that the strongest and the most persuasive rationale for majority rule relies upon the ideal of the political equality of all citizens, and that the best understanding of the ideal of political equality (supporting that of democracy) appeals to equality of political opportunity. Third, I argue that equality of political opportunity has some important institutional implications both at the stage of political deliberation and at the stage of actual collective decision-making. Fourth, I conclude that contemporary populism, with its unconstrained majority rule, plebiscitary model of politics, and “winner takes all” blueprint for the polity, offends against the major institutional implications of equality of political opportunity, and thus departs from, rather than enshrines, a model of democracy based on certain morally attractive rationales for the majority principle itself.