A failure to supervise: the SEC casts a shadow over internal investigations

J. Nowak, Thomas A. Zaccaro, Katherine K. Solomon
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Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this article is to highlight a recent settlement by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) in which it alleged that a regulated entity failed to supervise a representative principally because the entity did not establish clear guidance as to how its personnel should investigate red flags of a representative’s potential misconduct (e.g., how to follow up on the red flags and define the scope of any inquiry). Design/methodology/approach This article provides an overview of failure-to-supervise liability for broker-dealers and investment advisers, and highlights key takeaways from the SEC’s recent enforcement resolution that may be applied in establishing compliance procedures relating to internal investigations going forward. Findings The article concludes that the SEC appears to expect regulated entities to implement procedures guiding employees on “how to investigate” suspicious activity. Companies, however, should define such procedures in general terms to allow for flexibility in investigations, which can present unique or unforeseen situations. Internal procedures must also account for and preserve attorney-client privilege and attorney work product protections. Originality/value This article provides expert analysis and practical guidance from experienced lawyers in the Investigations and White Collar Defense and Securities Enforcement practices
监管不力:SEC给内部调查蒙上了阴影
本文的目的是强调美国证券交易委员会(“SEC”)最近达成的一项和解协议,该协议指控受监管实体未能监督代表,主要是因为该实体没有就其人员应如何调查代表潜在不当行为的危险信号(例如,如何跟进危险信号并定义任何调查的范围)建立明确的指导。本文概述了经纪自营商和投资顾问的监管失败责任,并强调了美国证券交易委员会最近的执法决议中的关键要点,这些决议可能适用于建立与未来内部调查相关的合规程序。文章的结论是,美国证券交易委员会似乎希望受监管的实体实施指导员工“如何调查”可疑活动的程序。然而,公司应以一般术语定义这些程序,以便在调查中具有灵活性,因为调查可能出现独特或不可预见的情况。内部程序还必须考虑并保护律师与当事人之间的保密特权和律师工作成果保护。原创性/价值本文提供了调查和白领辩护以及证券执法实践中经验丰富的律师的专家分析和实践指导
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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