Imperfect Credibility versus No Credibility of Optimal Monetary Policy

Jean-Bernard Chatelain, K. Ralf
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

A minimal central bank credibility, with a non-zero probability of not renegning his commitment ("quasi-commitment"), is a necessary condition for anchoring inflation expectations and stabilizing inflation dynamics. By contrast, a complete lack of credibility, with the certainty that the policy maker will renege his commitment ("optimal discretion"), leads to the local instability of inflation dynamics. In the textbook example of the new-Keynesian Phillips curve, the response of the policy instrument to inflation gaps for optimal policy under quasi-commitment has an opposite sign than in optimal discretion, which explains this bifurcation.
最优货币政策的不完全可信度与无可信度
最低限度的央行信誉,以及不违背其承诺(“准承诺”)的非零概率,是锚定通胀预期和稳定通胀动态的必要条件。相比之下,完全缺乏可信度,再加上决策者肯定会违背自己的承诺(“最佳裁量权”),就会导致局部通胀动态的不稳定。在新凯恩斯主义菲利普斯曲线的教科书示例中,准承诺下最优政策的政策工具对通胀缺口的反应与最优自由裁量权的反应相反,这解释了这种分歧。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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