Sinan Gokkaya, Xi Liu, V. Pool, Feixue Xie, Jinfan Zhang
{"title":"Is There Investment Value in Soft Dollar Arrangements? Evidence from Mutual Funds","authors":"Sinan Gokkaya, Xi Liu, V. Pool, Feixue Xie, Jinfan Zhang","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3225133","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Combining novel data on analyst employment history and mutual fund commission payments, we show that client funds generate higher returns on stocks for which they have access to research by industry expert analysts. The outperformance is greater when funds are more important clients, and it cannot be attributed to tipping. Client funds place modestly higher weights on stocks covered by industry expert analysts and allocate more commissions to brokers providing such coverage. For identification, we exploit exogenous analyst coverage disruptions. Our findings contribute to the debate concerning the unbundling of commissions under MiFID II and its implications for the U.S.","PeriodicalId":367054,"journal":{"name":"29th Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018 (Archive)","volume":"39 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-04-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"29th Annual Conference on Financial Economics & Accounting 2018 (Archive)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3225133","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Combining novel data on analyst employment history and mutual fund commission payments, we show that client funds generate higher returns on stocks for which they have access to research by industry expert analysts. The outperformance is greater when funds are more important clients, and it cannot be attributed to tipping. Client funds place modestly higher weights on stocks covered by industry expert analysts and allocate more commissions to brokers providing such coverage. For identification, we exploit exogenous analyst coverage disruptions. Our findings contribute to the debate concerning the unbundling of commissions under MiFID II and its implications for the U.S.