The Constitutional Allocation of Executive And Legislative Power Over Foreign Relations

Jenny S. Martinez
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

This chapter explores the allocation of authority between executive and legislative branch officials with respect to three areas: general foreign relations powers such as reception of ambassadors and recognition of foreign governments; treaty negotiation, ratification, and implementation; and war powers. Overall, it appears that most modern constitutions contemplate the sharing of foreign relations authority between the executive and legislative branches, with the precise boundaries of power more often determined by practicalities, politics, and particular circumstances than abstract theories. In particular, constitutional design choices are often influenced by the history and political context of a particular country and region, and provide a lens into what a given society views as important, dangerous, or problematic. The variations in design choices refute the notion that most foreign relations powers are inherently “executive” or “legislative” in nature, and instead highlight the ways in which design choices are embedded in broader social and political contexts.
对外关系行政立法权的宪法分配
本章探讨行政和立法部门官员在三个方面的权力分配:一般外交关系权力,如接待大使和承认外国政府;条约谈判、批准和执行;还有战争力量。总的来说,似乎大多数现代宪法都考虑到行政和立法部门之间外交权力的分享,权力的精确界限更多地取决于实际情况、政治和特定情况,而不是抽象的理论。特别是,宪法设计的选择往往受到特定国家和地区的历史和政治背景的影响,并提供了一个特定社会认为重要,危险或有问题的镜头。设计选择的变化反驳了大多数外交权力本质上是“行政”或“立法”的观念,而是强调了设计选择嵌入更广泛的社会和政治背景的方式。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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