{"title":"Neo-Aristotelian Supererogation","authors":"Rebecca Stangl","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780197508459.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter develops and defends the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: An action is supererogatory iff it is overall virtuous and either (1) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious, or (2) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious.\nThis account is non-ad-hoc insofar as it is based on virtue ethical accounts of right and wrong action that are motivated from within the tradition, and thus fully deserving of the label “neo-Aristotelian.” And it is intuitively defensible: it correctly identifies both heroic and saintly actions as supererogatory and gives a plausible explanation of their status as supererogatory. It also correctly identifies those instances of more mundane supererogation as supererogation and explains their status as supererogatory.","PeriodicalId":292246,"journal":{"name":"Neither Heroes nor Saints","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Neither Heroes nor Saints","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197508459.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This chapter develops and defends the following neo-Aristotelian account of supererogation: An action is supererogatory iff it is overall virtuous and either (1) the omission of an overall virtuous action in that situation would not be overall vicious, or (2) there is some overall virtuous action that is less virtuous than it and whose performance in its place would not be overall vicious.
This account is non-ad-hoc insofar as it is based on virtue ethical accounts of right and wrong action that are motivated from within the tradition, and thus fully deserving of the label “neo-Aristotelian.” And it is intuitively defensible: it correctly identifies both heroic and saintly actions as supererogatory and gives a plausible explanation of their status as supererogatory. It also correctly identifies those instances of more mundane supererogation as supererogation and explains their status as supererogatory.