What Is a Digital Gatekeeper? Which Platforms Should Be Captured by the EC Proposal for a Digital Market Act?

D. Geradin
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引用次数: 8

Abstract

In the past couple of years, several reports have concluded that a small number of large digital platforms act as gatekeepers in that they are necessary gateways between business users and their prospective customers. This allows these platforms to take advantage of the dependency of these business users on their services by imposing unfair trading terms. Since this issue may not be adequately addressed to competition law, this has led the European Commission to propose a Digital Market Act (DMA).

This paper focuses on the question of which digital platforms should be subject to ex ante regulation and, thus, to the obligations contained in DMA proposal. The methodology used to designate gatekeepers cannot be divorced from the issue(s) that ex ante regulation seeks to address as otherwise the DMA might end up regulating the wrong set of companies. The DMA Proposal designates as “gatekeepers” providers of core platforms services (CPS) that satisfy three cumulative qualitative criteria. These criteria are presumed to be satisfied when the CPS provider in question meets size-related quantitative thresholds. The DMA includes a mechanism allowing CPS providers that satisfy these quantitative thresholds to escape designation. Nevertheless, the paper shows that there is a risk that this process may capture platforms that, while they satisfy the quantitative thresholds due to their size, do not act as gatekeepers.

In this context, the paper makes some suggestions as to how the designation process could be improved to ensure that it exclusively targets platforms that are necessary gateways between business users and their prospective customers, hence creating dependency. The paper recommends a greater reliance on the concept of multi-homing, which has been extensively explored in the economic literature. In particular, multi-homing on both sides of a platform could be used as a safe harbour.
什么是数字看门人?欧共体数字市场法案提案应涵盖哪些平台?
在过去的几年中,一些报告得出结论,少数大型数字平台充当了看门人的角色,因为它们是业务用户和潜在客户之间必要的网关。这使得这些平台可以利用这些业务用户对其服务的依赖,强加不公平的交易条款。由于这一问题可能无法充分解决竞争法,这导致欧盟委员会提出了一项数字市场法案(DMA)。本文的重点是哪些数字平台应该受到事前监管的问题,从而受到DMA提案中所包含的义务的约束。用于指定看门人的方法不能与事前监管寻求解决的问题分开,否则DMA最终可能会监管错误的公司。DMA提案指定满足三个累积定性标准的核心平台服务(CPS)提供商为“看门人”。当有关的CPS提供商满足与规模相关的定量阈值时,就假定满足了这些标准。DMA包含一种机制,允许满足这些定量阈值的CPS提供者逃避指定。然而,该论文表明,这一过程可能会捕获平台的风险,这些平台虽然由于其规模而满足定量阈值,但不充当看门人。在这种情况下,本文就如何改进指定过程提出了一些建议,以确保它专门针对业务用户与其潜在客户之间必要的网关平台,从而产生依赖性。本文建议更多地依赖多重归巢的概念,这一概念在经济学文献中得到了广泛的探讨。特别是,平台两侧的多导归巢可以用作安全港。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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