Integrating digital twin security simulations in the security operations center

Marietheres Dietz, Manfred Vielberth, G. Pernul
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引用次数: 26

Abstract

While industrial environments are increasingly equipped with sensors and integrated to enterprise networks, current security strategies are generally not prepared for the growing attack surface that resides from the convergence of their IT infrastructure with the industrial systems. As a result, the organizations responsible for corporate security, the Security Operations Center (SOC), are overwhelmed with the integration of the industrial systems. To facilitate monitoring the industrial assets, digital twins represent a helpful novel concept. They are the virtual counterparts of such assets and provide valuable insights through collecting asset-centric data, analytic capabilities and simulations. Moreover, digital twins can assist enterprise security by simulating attacks and analyzing the effect on the virtual counterpart. However, the integration of digital twin security simulations into enterprise security strategies, that are mainly controlled by the SOC, is currently neglected. To close this research gap, this work develops a process-based security framework to incorporate digital twin security simulations in the SOC. In the course of this work, a use case along with a digital twin-based security simulation provides proof of concept. It is demonstrated how a man-in-the-middle attack can be performed in a simulated industry setting and how it affects the systems. Moreover, we show how the resulting system logs can support the SOC by building technical rules to implement in Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems.
在安全运营中心集成数字孪生安全仿真
虽然工业环境越来越多地配备传感器并集成到企业网络中,但当前的安全策略通常没有为来自IT基础设施与工业系统融合的日益增长的攻击面做好准备。因此,负责企业安全的组织,即安全运营中心(SOC),因工业系统的集成而不堪重负。为了便于监控工业资产,数字孪生代表了一个有用的新概念。它们是这些资产的虚拟对应物,并通过收集以资产为中心的数据、分析能力和模拟提供有价值的见解。此外,数字孪生可以通过模拟攻击和分析对虚拟对手的影响来帮助企业安全。然而,将数字孪生安全模拟集成到主要由SOC控制的企业安全策略中,目前被忽视。为了缩小这一研究差距,本工作开发了一个基于过程的安全框架,将数字孪生安全模拟纳入SOC。在这项工作的过程中,用例以及基于数字孪生的安全模拟提供了概念验证。演示了中间人攻击如何在模拟工业环境中执行,以及它如何影响系统。此外,我们还展示了生成的系统日志如何通过构建在安全信息和事件管理(SIEM)系统中实现的技术规则来支持SOC。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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