Neoclassical Realist Theory, Alliance Politics, and Nonproliferation

Abstract

Chapter 2 develops neoclassical realist theory. It explicates how the two systemic variables—the current distribution of power in a region and the time horizons for threats to the hegemon’s interests in that region—can create incentives for US presidential administrations to favor coercive or accommodative strategies toward a vulnerable ally seeking nuclear weapons. When confronted with such high domestic mobilization hurdles to their preferred strategies, however, administrations will pursue hybrid strategies—ones that combine accommodative and coercive elements—toward an ally. This chapter unpacks the measurement of the variables and the types of empirical evidence that might confirm or disconfirm the hypotheses. It also outlines three alternative explanations (nuclear domino theory, security commitment theory, and credible sanctions theory) and the types of evidence that might confirm or disconfirm their hypotheses.