An integrated game theoretical approach to detect misbehaving nodes in MANETs

C. Vijayakumaran, T. A. Macriga
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引用次数: 7

Abstract

Mobile Ad-hoc Networks are dynamic in nature and do not have fixed infrastructure to control nodes in the networks. The challenge lies ahead in coordinating among such dynamically moving nodes. Over a due course, nodes might become selfish and may refrain from packet forwarding because of the heavy dynamism. This selfish behavior might also result as an impact of malicious nodes in the neighborhood. Therefore, trust and reputation based mechanisms are required to keep the mobile neighbors intact. Assigning or altering the trust highly depends on the node behavior. Game theoretical approaches are more suitable in deciding upon the reward mechanisms for which the mobile nodes operate upon. Rewards or penalties have to be decided by ensuring a clean and healthy MANET environment. Not every time the same reward schemes are to be followed since this might result in malicious nodes attacking the rewarding scheme as well. Therefore, a non-routine yet surprise alterations are well required in place in deciding suitable and safe reward strategies. This work focuses on integrating a misbehavior node detection scheme and an incentive based reputation scheme with game theoretical approach called Supervisory Game to analyze the selfish behavior of nodes in the MANETs environment. The proposed work significantly reduces the cost of detecting misbehavior nodes in the network.
一种集成博弈论方法检测manet中的不良行为节点
移动自组织网络本质上是动态的,没有固定的基础设施来控制网络中的节点。挑战在于如何在这些动态移动的节点之间进行协调。在适当的时候,节点可能会变得自私,并且可能会因为高度动态而避免转发数据包。这种自私的行为也可能导致邻居中恶意节点的影响。因此,需要基于信任和声誉的机制来保持移动邻居的完整性。分配或更改信任高度依赖于节点的行为。博弈论方法更适合于决定移动节点所依据的奖励机制。奖励或处罚必须通过确保清洁和健康的MANET环境来决定。并非每次都遵循相同的奖励方案,因为这可能导致恶意节点也攻击奖励方案。因此,在决定合适和安全的奖励策略时,非常规但出人意料的改变是非常必要的。本研究将一种不当行为节点检测方案和一种基于激励的声誉方案与博弈论方法(监督博弈)相结合,分析了MANETs环境下节点的自私行为。所提出的工作显著降低了网络中检测错误行为节点的成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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