In Support of Valerie Plumwood

R. Brady
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Abstract

This paper offers general support for what Valerie Plumwood’s paper is trying to achieve by supporting the rejection of each of her four “false laws of logic”: exportation, illegitimate replacement, commutation (aka. permutation) and disjunctive syllogism. We start by considering her general characterizations of entailment, beginning with her stated definition of entailment as the converse of deducibility. However, this applies to a wide range of relevant logics and so is not able to be used as a criterion for deciding what laws to include in a logic. In this context, we examine the two key differences between deduction from premises to conclusion and entailment from antecedent to consequent. We also consider her use of sufficiency as a general characterizing feature. We then discuss Plumwood’s syntactic criteria used to reject the first three of her false laws of logic and add the Relevance Condition in this context. We next consider semantic characterizing criteria for a logic. After making a case against using truth, we introduce Brady’s logic MC of meaning containment. We then examine the content semantics for MC and use it to reject all of Plumwood’s false laws of logic together with some others. We follow with the related Depth Relevance Condition, which is a syntactic cri- terion satisfied by MC. This clearly rejects the first three of these laws and many others, but not the fourth law. We conclude by giving our overall support for her general enterprise.
支持瓦莱丽·普拉姆伍德
本文为瓦莱丽•普拉姆伍德(Valerie Plumwood)的论文试图实现的目标提供了总体支持,支持对她提出的四个“错误逻辑定律”中的每一个定律的否定:输出、非法替代、减刑(又名减刑)。排列)和析取三段论。我们首先考虑她对蕴涵的一般描述,从她将蕴涵定义为可演绎性的反面开始。然而,这适用于广泛的相关逻辑,因此不能用作决定逻辑中包含哪些定律的标准。在这种情况下,我们检查从前提到结论的演绎和从前因式到后因式的蕴涵之间的两个关键区别。我们还认为她使用充分性是一个普遍的特征。然后,我们讨论Plumwood用于拒绝前三个错误逻辑定律的句法标准,并在此上下文中添加关联条件。接下来我们考虑逻辑的语义特征标准。在对使用真理进行论证之后,我们引入了布雷迪的意义包容逻辑MC。然后,我们检查MC的内容语义,并使用它来拒绝所有Plumwood的错误逻辑定律以及其他一些定律。接下来是相关的深度关联条件,这是MC所满足的语法标准。这显然拒绝了前三个定律和许多其他定律,但没有拒绝第四个定律。最后,我们对她的总体事业给予全面支持。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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