ρFEM: Efficient Backward-edge Protection Using Reversed Forward-edge Mappings

Paul Muntean, Mathias Neumayer, Zhiqiang Lin, Gang Tan, Jens Grossklags, C. Eckert
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

In this paper, we propose reversed forward-edge mapper (ρFEM), a Clang/LLVM compiler-based tool, to protect the backward edges of a program’s control flow graph (CFG) against runtime control-flow hijacking (e.g., code reuse attacks). It protects backward-edge transfers in C/C++ originating from virtual and non-virtual functions by first statically constructing a precise virtual table hierarchy, with which to form a precise forward-edge mapping between callees and non-virtual calltargets based on precise function signatures, and then checks each instrumented callee return against the previously computed set at runtime. We have evaluated ρFEM using the Chrome browser, NodeJS, Nginx, Memcached, and the SPEC CPU2017 benchmark. Our results show that ρFEM enforces less than 2.77 return targets per callee in geomean, even for applications heavily relying on backward edges. ρFEM’s runtime overhead is less than 1% in geomean for the SPEC CPU2017 benchmark and 3.44% in geomean for the Chrome browser.
ρFEM:利用反向前边缘映射的有效后边缘保护
在本文中,我们提出了反向前向边缘映射器(ρFEM),一个基于Clang/LLVM编译器的工具,以保护程序的控制流图(CFG)的后向边缘免受运行时控制流劫持(例如,代码重用攻击)。它通过首先静态构造一个精确的虚表层次结构来保护C/ c++中源自虚函数和非虚函数的后向传输,利用该结构在调用者和基于精确函数签名的非虚调用目标之间形成精确的前向映射,然后在运行时根据先前计算的集合检查每个检测的被调用者返回。我们使用Chrome浏览器、NodeJS、Nginx、Memcached和SPEC CPU2017基准测试对ρFEM进行了评估。我们的结果表明,在几何图形中,即使对于严重依赖后边的应用,ρFEM在每个调用中强制执行的返回目标少于2.77个。在SPEC CPU2017基准测试中,ρFEM的运行时开销小于几何开销的1%,在Chrome浏览器中小于几何开销的3.44%。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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