{"title":"Abusive Judicial Review","authors":"Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.","PeriodicalId":111680,"journal":{"name":"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Abusive Constitutional Borrowing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192893765.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 3
Abstract
This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.