Two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation based on a tripartite game model

2019 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM) Pub Date : 2019-07-13 DOI:10.1109/ICSSSM.2019.8887851

Chi Zhou, Yiqing Li, Mingsen Chu, Xinxin Mi, Zhiyuan Luo

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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Advertisement recommendation service provides consumers with relevant product information and plays a guiding role when consumers search and buy products. However, some misleading advertisements are recommended to consumers for purpose of stimulating their purchasing desire. This paper investigates a problem in the field of two-stage advertisement recommendation service regulation, and a tripartite game model is established to analyze the relationship among the government, the rent-seeking platform, and the misleading advertiser. In addition, we explore the government supervision strategies and examine the effects of the penalty on the probability of publishing misleading advertisements. Then we further discuss how supervision costs and speculation profits impact the probably of supervision and rent-seeking separately. Moreover, numerical examples are given to validate the correctness of the conclusion. Finally, the article proposes some related suggestions for improving advertisement recommendation service regulation, thus offer feasible countermeasures to current government supervisory policy.

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基于三方博弈模型的两阶段广告推荐服务监管

广告推荐服务为消费者提供相关的产品信息，在消费者搜索和购买产品时起到引导作用。然而，一些误导性的广告被推荐给消费者，以刺激他们的购买欲望。本文研究了两阶段广告推荐服务监管中的一个问题，建立了一个三方博弈模型，分析了政府、寻租平台和误导广告主三者之间的关系。此外，我们还探讨了政府监管策略，并检验了处罚对发布误导性广告概率的影响。然后分别讨论了监管成本和投机利润对监管和寻租可能性的影响。并通过数值算例验证了结论的正确性。最后，本文提出了完善广告推荐服务监管的相关建议，从而为当前政府监管政策提供可行的对策。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2019 16th International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management (ICSSSM)

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