WALTER BURLEY ON SUPPOSITIO MATERIALIS

J. Kirk
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Abstract

This chapter examines the afterlife of late antique discussions of nonsignification among medieval Oxford logicians, focussing in particular on Walter Burley. It shows how, although their discipline was explicitly founded on a refusal to work with meaningless words, they ended up having to discuss them in connection with the phenomenon of material supposition, or the use of a word to refer to itself as a word (e.g., man is a monosyllable). Burley proposed a strange doctrine according to which the meaningless sound of the bare utterance can appear in a logical proposition; he insisted that the truth of such a proposition can be known and indicated that it provides a kind of mirror in which the mind can encounter itself in its very failure to cognize.
沃尔特·伯利论物质假设
这一章考察了中世纪牛津逻辑学家之间关于无意义的晚期古董讨论的来世,特别关注沃尔特·伯利。它表明,尽管他们的学科明确地建立在拒绝研究无意义的词的基础上,但他们最终不得不与物质假设现象或一个词作为一个词来指代自己的使用(例如,人是单音节的)联系起来讨论它们。伯利提出了一种奇怪的学说,根据这种学说,纯粹话语的无意义声音可以出现在逻辑命题中;他坚持认为,这样一个命题的真实性是可以被知道的,并指出它提供了一种镜子,在这种镜子中,心灵可以在认知的失败中遇到自己。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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