J. C. Robinson, W. S. Harrison, N. Hanebutte, P. Oman, J. Alves-Foss
{"title":"Implementing middleware for content filtering and information flow control","authors":"J. C. Robinson, W. S. Harrison, N. Hanebutte, P. Oman, J. Alves-Foss","doi":"10.1145/1314466.1314474","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper discusses the design and implementation of a middleware guard for purposes of content filtering and information flow control in the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture. The MILS initiative is a joint research effort between academia, industry, and government to develop and implement a high assurance real-time architecture for embedded systems. The MILS architecture incorporates a separation kernel with formal system security policies that are evaluatable, non-bypassable, tamper-proof, and always invoked. Vendor specific high-level applications are assumed to be untrustworthy components; information flow control needs to be performed by middleware entities external to the applications.\n In the MILS architecture, a MILS Message Router and guards are placed between communicating entities to act as message content filters and enforce information flow control. As the MILS architecture does not restrict the protocols that can be employed for communications between applications, a distinct guard is needed for filtering messages within each protocol. Incorporating protocol specific guards in MILS embedded systems aids in the formal certification of those systems or the high-assurance safety critical formally-proven applications. The guards enable formally-proven security policies that guarantee information flow control, data isolation, predictable process control, damage limitation, and resource availability. An example is provided using a multi-level secure file server that uses a GIOP guard for fine-grained access control. The inclusion of a GIOP guard reduces the complexity and the effort necessary for system certification.","PeriodicalId":121387,"journal":{"name":"Workshop on Computer Security Architecture","volume":"34 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2007-11-02","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Workshop on Computer Security Architecture","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/1314466.1314474","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7
Abstract
This paper discusses the design and implementation of a middleware guard for purposes of content filtering and information flow control in the Multiple Independent Levels of Security (MILS) architecture. The MILS initiative is a joint research effort between academia, industry, and government to develop and implement a high assurance real-time architecture for embedded systems. The MILS architecture incorporates a separation kernel with formal system security policies that are evaluatable, non-bypassable, tamper-proof, and always invoked. Vendor specific high-level applications are assumed to be untrustworthy components; information flow control needs to be performed by middleware entities external to the applications.
In the MILS architecture, a MILS Message Router and guards are placed between communicating entities to act as message content filters and enforce information flow control. As the MILS architecture does not restrict the protocols that can be employed for communications between applications, a distinct guard is needed for filtering messages within each protocol. Incorporating protocol specific guards in MILS embedded systems aids in the formal certification of those systems or the high-assurance safety critical formally-proven applications. The guards enable formally-proven security policies that guarantee information flow control, data isolation, predictable process control, damage limitation, and resource availability. An example is provided using a multi-level secure file server that uses a GIOP guard for fine-grained access control. The inclusion of a GIOP guard reduces the complexity and the effort necessary for system certification.