Leveraging Layout-based Effects for Locking Analog ICs

Muayad J. Aljafar, F. Azaïs, M. Flottes, S. Pagliarini
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Abstract

While various obfuscation methods exist in the digital domain, techniques for protecting Intellectual Property (IP) in the analog domain are mostly overlooked. Understandably, analog components have a small footprint as most of the surface of an Integrated Circuit (IC) is digital. Yet, since they are challenging to design and tune, they constitute a valuable IP that ought to be protected. This paper is the first to show a method to secure analog IP by exploiting layout-based effects that are typically seen as undesirable detractors in IC design. Specifically, we make use of the effects of Length of Oxide Diffusion and Well Proximity Effect on transistors for tuning the devices' critical parameters (e.g., gm and Vth). Such parameters are hidden behind key inputs, akin to the logic locking approach for digital ICs. The proposed technique is applied for locking an Operational Transconductance Amplifier. In order to showcase the robustness of the achieved obfuscation, the case studied circuit is simulated for a large number of key sets, i.e., >50K and >300K, and the results show a wide range of degradation in open-loop gain (up to 130dB), phase margin (up to 50 deg), 3dB bandwidth (≈2.5MHz), and power (≈1mW) of the locked circuit when incorrect keys are applied. Our results show the benefit of the technique and the incurred overheads. We also justify the non-effectiveness of reverse engineering efforts for attacking the proposed approach. More importantly, our technique employs only regular transistors and requires neither changes to the IC fabrication process nor any foundry-level coordination or trust.
利用基于布局的效果锁定模拟ic
虽然在数字领域存在各种混淆方法,但在模拟领域保护知识产权(IP)的技术往往被忽视。可以理解的是,由于集成电路(IC)的大部分表面是数字的,所以模拟元件的占地面积很小。然而,由于它们的设计和调整具有挑战性,因此它们构成了有价值的IP,应该受到保护。本文首次展示了一种通过利用基于布局的效应来保护模拟IP的方法,这些效应通常被视为IC设计中不受欢迎的诋毁者。具体来说,我们利用氧化物扩散长度和井邻近效应对晶体管的影响来调整器件的关键参数(例如,gm和Vth)。这些参数隐藏在键输入之后,类似于数字ic的逻辑锁定方法。该方法应用于运算跨导放大器的锁定。为了展示所实现的混淆的鲁棒性,对所研究的案例电路进行了大量密钥集(即>50K和>300K)的仿真,结果表明,当使用错误的密钥时,锁电路的开环增益(高达130dB),相位裕度(高达50度),3dB带宽(≈2.5MHz)和功率(≈1mW)的大范围退化。我们的结果显示了该技术的好处和产生的开销。我们还证明了攻击所建议的方法的反向工程工作的无效。更重要的是,我们的技术只使用常规晶体管,既不需要改变IC制造工艺,也不需要任何代工厂级的协调或信任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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